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Abstract
We investigate how fi rms in emerging economies choose among the different international 
bond markets: global, US144A and Eurobond markets. By exploiting the connection 
between the market of issuance and regulatory disclosure of information, we show that 
fi rms with poorer credit quality, less ability to absorb fl otation costs and more informational 
asymmetries issue debt in US144A and Eurobond markets, where regulation is lighter and 
information is less public. On the contrary, fi rms issuing global bonds – subject to full SEC 
requirements – are fi nancially sounder and larger. This exercise also shows that, following 
the global crisis, fi rms are more likely to tap less regulated debt markets. The results are 
supported by descriptive evidence, univariate non-parametric analyses, and conditional and 
multinomial logit analyses. To research the issue, we have constructed a novel dataset 
containing information on fi rms’ debt securities issuance and their fi nancial accounts for the 
period 2000-2014. To account for fi rms’ complex structures, we look at the balance sheet 
of the guarantor of debt, which need not be the issuing company. The dataset comprises 
3,944 debt securities, guaranteed by fi rms of 36 emerging economies, which amount to a 
total of 1.2 USD trillion in debt issued.
Keywords: bond markets, securities regulation, debt choice, Rule 144, Eurobond, Global bond.
JEL classifi cation: G15, G18, G32.
Resumen
En este trabajo se investiga cómo las empresas no fi nancieras de mercados emergentes 
eligen entre los diferentes mercados internacionales de bonos para fi nanciarse: el mercado 
global, el US144A y el mercado de eurobonos. Utilizando la relación entre el mercado de 
emisión y los requerimientos regulatorios de información de cada mercado, se concluye que 
las empresas con menor calidad crediticia, menor capacidad para absorber los costes de 
fl otación y con mayores asimetrías de información emiten deuda en el mercado US144A y 
en el de eurobonos, donde la regulación es más laxa y la información menos pública. Por el 
contrario, las empresas que emiten bonos en el mercado global, sujeto a la regulación de la 
SEC, presentan mejores condiciones fi nancieras y son más grandes. También se concluye 
que tras la crisis fi nanciera global las empresas tienden más a emitir deuda en los mercados 
menos regulados. Los resultados se basan en evidencia descriptiva, análisis univariante no 
paramétrico y análisis multivariante utilizando un logit multinomial. Para realizar este trabajo 
hemos elaborado una nueva base de datos que incluye información sobre las emisiones de 
deuda de las empresas y su información fi nanciera para el período 2000-2014. Debido a la 
compleja estructura de fi nanciación de muchas empresas, analizamos las hojas de balance 
de la empresa que garantiza la deuda, que puede no ser la entidad emisora. La base de 
datos incluye 3.944 bonos, garantizados por empresas de 36 economías emergentes y 
acumulando un total de 1,2 miles de millones de dólares.
Palabras clave: mercados internacionales de bonos, decisiones de fi nanciación, regulación 
de mercados de capitales, eurobonos, bonos globales, mercado US144A.
Códigos JEL: G15, G18, G32.
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1. Introduction 
The post-crisis international financial markets are defined by the transition towards 
market-based financing. Emerging economies firms are obtaining substantial amounts 
of funding from international bond markets and they are managing to do so at long 
maturities (Shin (2013))2. This easy access to debt-markets is attributed to global 
financial conditions (Lo Duca et al. (2015), Ayala et al. (2015), Feyen et al. (2015)). 
Among the lenders, non-bank institutions have stepped into the provision of credit, in a 
context of low returns on traditional assets. Overall, the process is deemed to pose 
significant risks for international financial stability: borrowers could be raising too 
much debt and lenders could be underestimating the risk. However, there is 
considerable uncertainty about the actual credit risks and the characteristics of firms 
raising funds in international markets (Gruic et al. (2014), Chui et al. (2014)). Research 
has been limited by lacking firm-level information. Though, existing analyses suggest 
that there is significant dispersion in leverage, profitability, risk of financial distress, or 
quality of assets (Fuertes and Serena (2014); chart I.1. in Annex I). The evidence 
suggests that different borrowers are acceding different debt-markets: some firms have 
healthy balance-sheets; others have much poorer credit quality.   
Overall, this raises far-reaching questions. Which firms issue debt securities in each of 
the different bond markets? Do firms’ choices depend on their credit quality, or on the 
degree of informational asymmetries between firms and non-bank lenders? Finally, are 
there any changes after the global financial crisis?   
These issues remain obscured as studies related to post-crisis market based financing 
consider all international corporate bonds as being issued in a single market. Quite the 
opposite, there is a wide range –the Yankee, Samurai, Global, or Eurobond markets, to 
name a few. Indeed, a bond market is a specific environment in which borrowers issue 
securities, and investors acquire them, subject to a given regulation and using a specific 
electronic platform. Since international bond markets exhibit different regulations, they 
might attract different investors and firms. On these grounds, international bond markets 
can be classified in four groups: the foreign bond market, the global bond market, the 
US 144A bond market and the Eurobond market. Foreign and global bond markets are 
strictly regulated. The regulation of the US 144A bond market is much lighter and the 
Eurobond market is an offshore market where debt-securities are not subject to any 
local regulation. Debt-securities regulation requires firms to provide public, timely and 
accurate information on firms’ financial statements. Thus, in the latter two markets, 
investors need to screen privately borrowers’ credit quality, delving into their financial 
accounts, income statements, or strategic plans. Their differences in regulation make 
these markets distinct in terms of volume, quality, and timeliness of public information; 
the type of investors able to invest in each market; and the underlying liquidity of the 
securities. 
In this paper we investigate how firms choose among the existing international bond 
markets. Using univariate analyses, we find that firms borrowing in less regulated 
markets have lower credit quality, less ability to absorb high flotation costs, and exhibit 
more informational asymmetries. On the other hand, global bonds –subject to SEC 
                                                          
2 The terms bond and debt-securities refer to fixed-income securities; we prefer the second one, since the first suggests there is 
homogeneity within this class of securities (while there is not). 
3
For instance, a Mexican firm issuing a bond in the US; in contrast, a firm domiciled in the US issuing a debt security in the US, is 
carrying out a US domestic placement. The popular distinction between domestic and international debt markets reflects the relationship 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1603
requirements- are issued by larger and high-quality firms.  Next, we investigate firms’ 
incremental debt choice among existing international debt-securities markets using 
multivariate models. The results of ordinal, and multinomial logit models confirm that 
firms with less ability to absorb high flotation costs and suffering informational 
asymmetries are more likely to issue debt in less regulated markets.  We also find that 
after the global financial crisis, firms’ propensity to issue debts in US 144A and 
Eurobond markets has increased. Finally, firms are more likely to issue debt in 
regulated markets during periods of risk aversion and volatility.  
To investigate the issue, we have constructed a unique database comprising firm-level 
and deal-specific information for all emerging economies firms active in international 
markets during the period 2000-2014. Our database is built around the firms 
guarantying the debt-securities, which need not be the issuer companies. Debt-
guarantors are the entities which would be liable in case of distress. The database 
contains information on firms’ financial accounts, corporate structure, and non-financial 
information as well as on the type of debt-securities issued. Overall, there is information 
for 1,584 firms, which issue a total of 3,944 securities, for a total amount of 1.2 USD 
trillion.  The database covers unlisted firms, firms listed in local exchanges, and firms 
cross-listed in the US.  
This article makes several contributions to the literature on the choice of debt type. To 
our knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes the firm´s debt choice decision 
among all options available in international capital markets, focusing on the different 
regulatory regimes of each market. Besides, our paper is the first one analyzing the 
choice of debt type treating firms as consolidated entities, in line with the newest 
standards in international finance (Bruno and Shin (2015), Adjveiv et al. (2015)). 
Our findings are related to previous literature analyzing the firm´s choice between 
public and private debt. Blackwell and Kindell (1988) show that firms with low 
flotation costs and low agency costs tend to issue public bonds instead of private bonds. 
Similarly, we find that firms with access to the global market, where bonds are public, 
face lower flotation costs and lower agency costs (less informational asymmetries). 
Esho et all. (1999)  obtain similar results using data on bank loans (a type of private 
debt) and corporate bonds (foreign bonds and Eurobonds). Other studies find that firms 
with poor credit quality rely mostly on private debt (Denis and Mihov (2003), Arena 
(2010), Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004)). Our results are somehow mixed in this 
regard. The univariate analysis confirms that firms with access to the global market 
have better financial conditions. On the other hand, the multivariate analysis does not 
show that sounder firms tend to issue debt in the global market, after taking into account 
other factors.  
Though, comparing our results with previous empirical findings is tricky due to several 
reasons: first, our paper focuses on the choice among all available bond markets, while 
most of previous literature delved into the choice between private - bank loans- and 
public debt –corporate bonds-, without exploiting the differences in the latter. Similar to 
us, Gao (2011) and Resnick (2012) use datasets that include all type of international 
bonds but they do not analyze the determinants of the decision choice among all 
different alternatives. Finally, by examining emerging market firms and covering the 
period 2000-2014, we are able to exploit a rich heterogeneity at the firm-level.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretically how 
firms choose among international debt-securities markets; and presents the variables 
used to empirically investigate their choice.  In section 3 we describe our database, and 
present the univariate analysis. In section 4 we present the multivariate analysis of 
firms’ incremental debt choice. Finally, in section 5 we summarize the main 
conclusions.  
 
2. Background 
 
2.1. Regulation of international bond markets and public information: foreign, 
global, US144A and Eurobond markets  
There are different international bond markets. Bonds are considered issued in an 
international market when the issuer is not domiciled in the jurisdiction (BIS-ECB-IMF 
(2015)) 3. Accordingly, international bonds are those in which the issuer is subject to a 
non-local regulation. Thus, it is small wonder that the regulation of international bond 
markets differs substantially: international bonds can be either strictly regulated by a 
foreign local rule, subject to specific local rules, or be unregulated in offshore markets. 
The aim of regulation is, quoting IOSCO, to ensure “full disclosure of information 
material to investors”; this is the mechanism to “protect investors, maintain fair, 
efficient and transparent markets, and seek to address systemic risks” (IOSCO (2010)) 
Overall, this implies that there are noticeable differences in the volume, quality, and 
timeliness of public information, depending on the bond market the firm chooses.  
On these grounds, international bond markets can be classified in four groups: the 
foreign bond market, the global market, the US144A rule bond market, and the 
Eurobond market.  Foreign and global bond markets are public debt markets. They are 
tightly regulated, and issuers are required to disclose publicly financial information, 
fulfilling detailed and often burdensome regulatory requirements. Investors cannot 
influence the design of the security, which is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
Accordingly, debt-securities are fairly standardized, and more liquid than otherwise. 
The risks of investment in these firms are often assessed through an external rating 
agency: investors do not screen privately the quality of the firm, nor monitor ex-post 
managers’ decisions. There are many bondholders, and do not have expertise in 
liquidating firms; their losses in an event of financial distress are expectedly larger. The 
US rule 144A and the Eurobond market are institutional/wholesale and private bond 
markets. They are subject to lighter regulation. Borrowers disclose privately 
information to a narrower set of informed potential lenders, which include institutional 
investors -such as insurance companies or pension funds. These lenders have expertise 
in dealing with informational asymmetries surrounding the firm value and agency 
problems. They might require firms to include covenants or options to mitigate adverse 
selection or moral hazard problems. Debt-securities are less standardized and henceforth 
less liquid. Also, the role of external credit agencies is far less important. In an event of 
                                                          
3
For instance, a Mexican firm issuing a bond in the US; in contrast, a firm domiciled in the US issuing a debt security in the US, is 
carrying out a US domestic placement. The popular distinction between domestic and international debt markets reflects the relationship 
between the residence of debt issuer and the market of issuance location. Following this convention, domestic debt issuances are 
placements by resident issuers in their home-countries.  
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distress, liquidation is more efficient since lenders have expertise and have designed 
provisions to cope with it.  
 
 
The differences in public information of international bond markets have been 
investigated in previous studies. Most research had compared either Yankee (US 
foreign) and US144 bonds (Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004), Fenn (2001), Esho et al. 
(1999), Arena (2011), Gomes and Phillips (2011)) or Yankee and Eurobonds (Miller 
and Puthenpurackal (2001)). In this article we add to the few papers that cover all 
markets (Gao (2011) and Resnick (2012)).  
The main features of these markets are described in table 1. Foreign bonds are 
issuances by non-resident firms in a given local market. These deals are referred to with 
nicknames related to the corresponding local market of issuance (Yankee, Samurai, 
etc)4. For instance, a firm domiciled in Mexico issuing a debt-security in the US public 
debt market, subject to the US regulatory standards is classified as a Yankee bond. 
Regulation requires firms issuing in these markets to provide substantial public 
                                                          
4 They are called Yankee bond, if they are issued in the US local market; Samurai, for debt-securities in the Japanese local market; 
Bulldog refers to issuances in the UK local market; and so on. In terms of debt-securities regulation, foreign and domestic debt-
placements are very similar; their only difference is that foreign debt-placements are carried out by firms incorporated overseas, while 
domestic debt-placements are accomplished by resident firms. Regulators can make minor distinctions between domestic and foreign 
firms, but overall face same similar requirements. That is, foreign firms issuing Yankee debt-securities are subject to similar SEC 
regulatory requirements than US firms. 
Foreign bond 
market 
(e.g.,Yankee)
Global bond 
market
US Rule 144 A 
bond market
Eurodollar bond 
market
Type of 
offering
INSTITUTIONAL/
WHOLESALE 
OFFERING
INSTITUTIONAL/
WHOLESALE 
OFFERING & 
PRIVATE
Regulation
US regulation, SEC 
rule 144A 
exemptions
MIFID & exchange-
regulated
Disclosure 
requirements
Medium Medium/Low
Sales 
restrictions
Yes Yes
Type of 
investors
QIB QIB
US regulation, SEC full regulation
High. Firms need to file form 20-K; financial 
accounts using US GAAP.
No
No restrictions; includes retail investors
Source: own elaboration; see also Gao (2011). 
Table 1. Markets of international debt-securities issuances. Main features
PUBLIC OFFERING
Description
Non-resident public 
offering in a foreign 
local market; Yankee, 
non-US firm in US public 
market.
Public offering in at 
least one foreign 
local market; we 
assume it involves 
placement in US 
US institutional 
offering, following 
rule 144A
EU institutional 
offering &private 
offshore offering
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information. The disclosure of information reduces the asymmetry of information and 
gives access to a broad pool of non-sophisticated investors. US debt-securities 
regulation constitutes a relevant example5. The requirements are ruled by the Securities 
Act of 1933, which requires SEC registration. The process is lengthy and particularly 
burdensome for foreign firms, since firms have to file their financial accounts using the 
US GAAP. Global bonds are debt-securities publicly placed by non-resident firms in at 
least one local market. A Mexican-firm issuing a debt-security simultaneously in the US 
and Japanese debt market is issuing a global bond. Global bonds are often very large. 
Thus firms aiming to raise large volumes of funds can target different pools of 
investors. But, in terms of regulation, they are similar to foreign bonds: typically, global 
bonds place at least one tranche in the US, so are fully-subject to the SEC requirements. 
Similar to Yankee bonds or US domestic public-debt placements, there is public 
information available.  
Overall, global and foreign bond markets share many features: investors dispose public 
and high-quality information; they do not need any specific technology to monitor 
borrowers’ credit quality and retail investors are able to buy and trade these securities. 
Thus, the investors’ base is much atomized, and securities are relatively standardized. 
The underlying assets are liquid, and there is a secondary market for them. The 
importance of foreign bond placements has faded over time, so in the paper we will 
emphasize firms’ choice between global and institutional/wholesale securities markets.  
Debt securities issued under the US Rule 144A constitute another market. It is a 
specific and very relevant one. The 144A private placement market developed after the 
Securities Exchange Commission introduced in 1990 the Rule 144A. Rule 144A created 
a second-tier market for both US and non-US firms. Firms issuing under the US Rule 
144A are subject to much softer requirements on the quality, volume, and frequency of 
financial accounts disclosure. Rule 144A allows trading these debt-securities among 
“qualified institutional buyers” (QIB). Non-US firms became very active in this market, 
since the SEC requirements to issue in the US public markets were particularly 
burdensome for them6. Rule 144A debt-securities have low liquidity, and a substantial 
fraction of international investors is banned from investing in them. Thus, it has features 
of non-bank private debt (Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004), Fenn (2001), Esho et al. 
(1999), Arena (2011), Gomes and Phillips (2011)). 
Finally, the last international debt-market firms have available is the Eurobond 
market. Eurobonds are debt securities in which investors need own technology to 
monitor borrowers’ risks. In terms of existing regulation, Eurobonds are totally different 
from each of the other markets described: debt securities are not subject to any local 
jurisdiction (Esho et al. (2001), Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002)). Indeed, the 
Eurobond market developed to bypass the existing local jurisdictions. SEC rules imply 
that Eurobonds cannot be sold in US capital markets: bonds are bearer, and are not 
registered in the SEC, as Yankee or global bonds are; they are not either subject to the 
144A Rule regulatory requirements. Eurobonds markets are necessarily less liquid, and 
the pool of potential investors is limited to sophisticated institutional investors.  
                                                          
5 Registration is a process in which firms provide a description of the company, of the security offered for sale, the management of the 
company and the firm financial statements. The firm will need to file every year the form 20-F, in which are requested to provide 
standardized financial information. Other local legislations are deemed to share similar features. 
6 Frequently they are not listed in the US, and firms need to provide additional information, or adapt their financial statements to the US 
GAAP. This contrasts with the much softer requirements of information disclosure of 144A private placements. 
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2.2. Firms’ choice between issuing public and institutional/wholesale offerings 
Firms can choose between two types of outside financing: global bonds, which are 
public debt; and institutional/wholesale offerings, which encompass the US144A and 
the Eurobond markets7. There is a theory of placement structure of non-bank debt 
(Blackwell and Kidwell (1988), Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Kwan and Carleton 
(2010)). It stresses that public and non-bank private debt exhibit significant differences 
in five dimensions: flotation costs, effectiveness in addressing informational 
asymmetries, efficiency of liquidation and renegotiation in an event of distress, the 
liquidity of the underlying debt-security and the matching process of lenders and 
borrowers. Firms will issue debt-securities in the market in which their funding costs 
are smaller8.  We will study how these factors affect the choice of debt among the 
different markets: global bonds, Rule 144 A bonds and Eurobonds. 
First, flotation costs are larger in the public-debt securities markets (as discussed, for 
instance Blackwell and Kidwell (1988)). These costs include all the expenses that 
borrowers need to pay to issue the debt-security, and include underwriter compensation, 
legal fees, accountants’ fees, costs of fulfilling the regulatory requirements at the time 
of the issuance, and ongoing basis. To issue a debt-security in the public-debt market, 
firms need to disclose public information to all potential investors. Compliance is 
costly, in particular for emerging economies firms, which need to provide a substantial 
amount of information following non-local accounting standards (IFRS or US GAAP). 
Though, the bulk of flotation costs are fixed: they do not increase on the size of the 
amount issued. Hence, public-debt issuances become less and less expensive the larger a 
firm is, the larger the amount it want to raise, or if the issuer is already complying with 
the required disclosure of information.  
Second, private debt-securities markets are more effective to address informational 
asymmetries between firms and investors (see Krishnaswami et al. (1999) and 
references therein). Problems of adverse selection plague debt-financing (Myers and 
Majluf (1984). They occur when investors have incomplete information on firms’ actual 
value –or disagree with the managers about its value. Agency problems are also 
frequent: managers’ commitment to maximize the firms’ value can change after lending 
occurs (Green (1984), Green and Talmor (1985), Myers (1977))9. In the process of 
issuing privately a security, lenders can require value-decreasing concessions to 
mitigate agency costs: include negative covenants to align the incentives of equity and 
bond-holders; or additional guarantees to mitigate some specific risks. Through the 
process, the risks of adverse selection can also be mitigated: informed lenders can 
require firms to include dissipative signals, such as short-maturities, collateral posting, 
establish a sinking fund, or embed convertible rights. Overall, when there are 
asymmetries of information between borrowers and lenders, the cost of funding is 
expectedly lower in private debt markets: firms are more likely to issue in the private 
debt-securities markets if information asymmetry is severe.  
                                                          
7 There are more popular distinctions. A first one stresses the type of lender: debt borrowed from banks, in the form of loans; and debt 
borrowed from non-banks, in the form of debt-securities. A second one emphasizes the type of debt: privately originated debt, versus 
publicly issued debt. It is common to establish a correspondence between both: bank loans are considered the only source of private 
lending; debt-securities acquired by non-bank lenders are considered public-debt. But this correspondence is inaccurate: we argue that 
debt-securities markets differ in the public information available to investors: its timeliness, quality, and volume.  
8 For some firms there is an additional factor, not discussed in this note: the desire to diversify funding costs. 
9 Due to risk-shifting or asset substitution. 
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Third, firms’ distress is less costly for investors in the private debt-securities markets. 
Investors in privately originated debt are fewer; they are more sophisticated, and 
probably have included covenants to ease the management of the process. In contrast, 
investors in public debt markets face important coordination problems and difficulties to 
maximize the liquidation value. Overall, the liquidation value of the firm is higher for 
investors in private-debt markets. These arguments were first raised for bank private 
debt (Berlin and Loyes (1988) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)); they apply as 
well to other non-bank private lenders (Denis and Mihov (2003)). Overall, firms with 
higher credit risk pay a large spread to issue debt in public markets; similarly, a larger 
spread will be charged for firms with less fungible assets, such as goodwill or patents. 
Thus, these firms are more likely to borrow privately.     
Fourth, there are differences in the liquidity of the markets, which affect liquidity 
premium. Public debt markets are more liquid. There are two reasons. The first are the 
differences in information on firms’ credit quality. As described above, in public debt 
markets information is publicly available, and many securities are rated; moreover, the 
asymmetries of information are less severe. Hence, it is easier to trade an existing debt-
security, since there are no asymmetries of information between the owner of the 
security, and other potential investors. A second one is the standardization of securities. 
Lack of standardization is one of the major causes of low liquidity (Blackrock (2013, 
2014)). In private debt markets, debt securities often include covenants designed to 
mitigate asymmetries of information between the borrower and a narrow set of informed 
lenders; while these covenants might be valuable dissipative signals by the initial 
investors, they need not be valued by other investors, and make complex selling of the 
security.  
Finally, markets differ in how they are affected by global financial conditions. The 
matching process of lenders and borrowers is different. In public debt-securities 
markets, an underwriter issues the security on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In private debt-
securities markets, there are more frequent interactions between the issuer (or its 
investment bank) and potential buyers. Hence, global financial conditions can impact 
differently firms’ access to these markets. Empirical evidence suggests that uncertainty 
in bond markets –measured by the volatility of benchmark bond indexes- impairs more 
severely public bond markets (Blackwell and Kidwell (1988)). Though, this need not be 
the case in emerging economies firms; international investors might be reluctant to 
invest in less tradable securities during a period of heightened uncertainty.  
 
2.3. Determinants of debt choice 
The theory predicts that firms’ decision to issue in the private debt-securities market 
depends negatively on the ability to absorb flotation costs, positively on information 
asymmetries, and on firms’ risks of financial distress. It depends positively on the 
difference between the flotation costs in the global and the private-debt markets, and 
positively in the liquidity gap between both markets.  
To analyze how these factors condition the choice among the different international 
bond markets we use two types of firm-level variables: firm-specific information and 
financial contract characteristics; the latter signal, in an indirect way, the type of firm 
acceding the market.  
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a) Flotation costs: to measure flotation costs we include the amount raised by the 
firm: the larger the amount, the lower the fixed flotation cost relative to the total 
proceeds. As an alternative, we include the firm size, measured by its total assets (Denis 
and Mihov (2003), Kwan and Carleton (2010), Blackwell and Kidwell (1988), 
Krishnaswami et al. (1999)). Incidentally, flotation costs can be lower for firms which 
are already complying with the disclosure requirements imposed by securities 
regulation. These requirements represent a substantial amount of the total flotation costs 
in Global bond markets, and are considered particularly burdensome for non-US firms 
(Gao (2011)). Firms whose equity is cross-listed in US exchange markets are already 
complying with SEC requirements. Hence, we use as a proxy of ability to absorb 
flotation costs the existence of exchange-listed ADRs (American Depositary Receipts). 
Finally, we use firms’ reporting GAAP. Firms reporting the financial statements with 
their local GAAP cannot issue debt in regulated international capital markets, unless 
they provide supplementary information using IFRS or US GAAP. This creates an 
additional cost of issuing a debt-security in the global bond market.  
 
 
 
b) Financial contracting costs due to informational asymmetries: to measure 
informational asymmetries, we include the following variables. First, we gauge the 
actual value of firms’ assets including the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (Denis 
and Mihov (2003)). Holding everything else equal, lenders face less uncertainty 
investing in firms with a higher proportion of fixed assets. Hence, firms with a higher 
proportion of fixed assets to total assets are less likely to issue debt in the 
institutional/wholesale markets (Eurobond and US 144A).  
Second, firms with severe informational asymmetries will not find useful to improve the 
quality of public information: only sophisticated investors will be able to gauge the 
actual value of the firm. To measure firms’ willingness to improve the quality of public 
Firm-specific features Variables (expected sign) Description
Flotation Costs Firm total assets (-)
Amount issued (-)
US American Depositary Receipt  (-) 1 if firm is cross-listed in US through ADR
Local GAAP (+) 1 if firm files using a local GAAP
Informational Asymmetries Fixed assets to total assets (-)
Firm total assets (-)
Local GAAP (+) 1 if firm files using a local GAAP
Credit rating on the debt-security (-) 1 if firms issues bonds with credit rating (any)
Bond with convertible rights (+) 1 if firm issues bonds withs convertible rights
5-year growth in firm total assets (+)
Bond Maturity (-)
Liquidation & renegotiation Altman score (-) 1 if Altman score is below 1.21 (distress zone)
Bond with sinking fund (+) 1 if firm issues bonds with sinking fund
Fixed assets to total assets (-)
VIX (+/-) Average VIX in 20 working days before issuance
MOVE (+/-) Average MOVE in 20 working days before issuance
Bond holders rights (+) 1 if firm issues bonds with sinking fund put option, or  convertible rights
Bond with call option (-) 1 if firm issues bonds with call option
Bond with put option (+) 1 if firm issues bonds with put option
Table 2. Financing costs. Main variables and expected impact on likehood firms issue through institutional/wholesale 
offering
Primary market efficiency and 
global conditions
General 
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information we use the existence of a credit rating on a debt-security10.We expect 
that firms issuing unrated debt are more likely to issue in the institutional/wholesale 
markets. We also exploit information on bonds’ convertible rights. These are 
embedded options which grant holders the right to convert the debt-security into equity. 
Firms attach convertible rights to debt-securities to alleviate contracting costs 
(Krishnaswami and Yaman (2008), Brennan and Swartz (1988), Lewis et al. (1998))11. 
Convertible rights reduce the funding costs when there is disagreement between 
shareholders and lenders about a firm value or its prospects (adverse selection); or fears 
of ex-post commitment to maximize firms’ value (agency costs). Firms suffering more 
from informational asymmetries are more likely to issue bonds with convertible rights, 
and we use it as a proxy of informational asymmetries. Finally, firms can choose issuing 
debt-securities at short-term maturities in case of uncertainty about their future 
investment decisions. Thus, we include the bond maturity as a proxy of informational 
asymmetries –in this case, of moral hazard-. 
c) Liquidation and renegotiation costs: Next, we discuss the variables included to 
measure a firm probability of financial distress, and the expected liquidation costs. First, 
we use the Altman score as a measure of a firm probability of distress. The Altman 
score is a synthetic measure of a firm ability to repay debt obligations12.  Following 
Denis and Mihov (2003), we define a binary variable taking value 1 of the Altman score 
is lower than 1.21; this defines firms with a high probability of financial distress. 
Second, we use as a proxy the existence of a sinking fund attached to the debt-
security. A sinking fund is a fund set up to pay back the bond. Firms set up sinking 
funds to minimize the cost of funding when the risk of financial distressed is perceived 
to be large. Low quality issues involve sinking funds; high quality funds rarely do so 
(Brealey et al. (2014). Thus, we define a binary variable taking value 1 if the bond 
issued has a sinking fund. Besides, we use a number of financial ratios: interest 
coverage ratio, ROA, leverage, and current ratio. Following standard credit risk 
techniques, we compare each firm with its peers.  Hence, we construct industry-adjusted 
financial ratios, defined as deviations with respect to its industry median. These annual 
industry medians are obtained using the worldwide population of firms of each industry 
(see Appendix 1 for details). Finally, we investigate a firm liquidation value using the 
fixed assets to total assets ratio. In an event of distress, fixed assets lose less value 
during the liquidation process, since are more fungible than intangible assets (Esho et al. 
(1999)).  Hence, we expect firms with a lower proportion of fixed assets to issue debt in 
the private debt markets.  
d) Global financial conditions: we measure global financial conditions using the 
average of the MOVE index13 in the twenty days before the issuance.  As an alternative, 
we compute a similar average for the VIX index. The impact of these variables is 
uncertain. On the one hand, a tightening in global financial conditions can alter firms’ 
choices among the different markets: underwriters’ risks are deemed to increase 
                                                          
10 At this point, we are interested in the sheer existence of a rating; we will control for the credit quality using different financial ratios-. 
11 There is debate about the relative importance of each of these two factors, being the empirical evidence about the underlying cause 
mixed (see Dutordoir et al. (2014) for a review). Overall, there is support for the hypotheses that firms issue debt-securities with 
convertible rights to mitigate adverse selection; and less so, to mitigate moral hazard. Recent research suggests that the conversion 
features (date of conversion, callability of the bond, term) can make these debt-securities more akin to an equity-security or to a debt-
security; the former are better suited to mitigate adverse selection, the latter to mitigate agency costs.  
12 
More specifically, we use the Altman score for private companies; this way we are able to compute it for firms which are not listed in 
equity markets. This score is equal to 0.717*x1+0.847*x2+3.107*x3+0.42*x4+0.998*x5; where x1 is working capital to total assets, x2 
retained earnings to total assets, x3 is EBITDA to total assets, x4 is book value of equity to total debt, and x5 sales revenue to total 
assets.  
13 MOVE (Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate) is a yield curve weighted index of the implied volatility on 1-month treasury options.   
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disproportionally in public offerings, thus making more convenient issuing in 
institutional/wholesale markets (Blackwell and Kidwell (1988)). Though, existing 
evidence is mixed so-far (Kwan and Carleton (2010)). On the other hand, issuances in 
institutional/wholesale markets take less time, and firms can choose better the market-
timing; this argument suggests it is less likely to see firms issuing in US144A or 
Eurobond during periods of high volatility, since they can more easily avoid placing 
bonds in such circumstances.   
 
3. Dataset 
 
3.1. A micro-level database for macrofinancial analysis 
We gather all the debt-securities issued in international markets during the period 2000-
2014, and guaranteed by emerging economies firms. We cover 36 countries of four 
emerging economies regions: Emerging Asia, Latin America, Emerging Europe, and 
Africa and Middle East14. We have obtained the database using Bloomberg. To carry 
out the analysis, we construct a firm-year database, using the deal-level information. 
The database has three defining features. First, it is built around the firms guaranteeing 
the debt-securities, instead of the issuer entities; this allows mimicking properly the 
risk-analysis carried out by international investors when deciding to invest in a given 
debt-security. Second, the debt-securities information contains bonds from the foreign 
market, global market, US 144 A market and Eurobond market. . Finally, the firm-level 
information is comprehensive and contains the debt-securities guaranteed by unlisted 
firms, firms listed in local exchanges, and firms cross-listed also in US exchanges.  
Overall, these three features make our database comprehensive and entirely consistent: 
it contains 3,944 debt-securities, issued by 1,584 firms in the period 2000-2014, which 
make up a total amount of 1.2 USD trillion.  
 
3.2. A criterion: analyzing  firms that guarantee the debt-securities 
 The organizational structures of emerging economies firms have become very complex. 
Firms have affiliates incorporated all over the world. But these affiliates have different 
degrees of financial autonomy relative to their parent institutions: some are fully-
supported, while others are fully-independent; some other receive explicit guarantees in 
specific financial operations. 
Our purpose is to mimic the risk-analysis carried out by international investors; this is 
key to understand firms’ choices of market of issuance as they depend on the yield 
international investors require. We assume investors price the risk of investing in a 
debt-security analyzing the firm guaranteeing it: legally, it is the entity liable in case of 
distress. This criterion is superior to the other two alternatives: the analysis of the 
issuer-firm, or the parent company.  
                                                          
14 Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela; Emerging Europe includes 
Bulgaria, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, 
Ukraine; Africa & Middle East includes Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, UAE. Emerging Asia includes India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea. 
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Accordingly, we obtain all debt-securities guaranteed by emerging economies firms, 
following a previous contribution (Fuertes and Serena (2014)). We are the first to use 
this criterion, although the importance of assigning deals to the firm guaranteeing the 
debt-security had already been suggested (Esho, Lam, and Sharpe (2001)). Due to 
problems to match systematically the debt-security with the underlying firm-level data, 
previous papers had decided to use a more conservative approach and focus only on 
observations in which debt-issuers and debt-guarantors coincide.  
Instead, we use the following rule: if a debt-security is issued by an entity, and 
guaranteed by another, we match the deal with the corresponding information of the 
firm guaranteeing it. We interpret the issuer-entity is transferring upstream its risk to the 
guarantor. This criterion applies to all issuer-entities: non-financial affiliates and 
offshore/onshore financial vehicles. If, alternatively, an entity issues debt without 
explicit guarantee of another company, we use the issuer information. Most probably, 
the issuer will be a non-financial affiliate, fully-independent from its parent company15.  
Figure 1 provides an example in which a company guarantees the debt-securities issued 
by a non-financial affiliate and a financial vehicle; these entities can be incorporated 
domestically or overseas.  This company has a second non-financial affiliate, which is 
financially independent: the debt-securities it issues do not receive any explicit 
guarantee.  
This criterion prevents two problems. Firstly, it ensures gathering systematically all the 
debt-guaranteed by emerging economies firms: we obtain information on all debt whose 
financial risks lay in an emerging economy16. Secondly, the criterion mimics the 
investment decision process of international investors, since the focus lies on the entity 
backing the debt-securities. For the purpose of understanding firms’ choices, it is 
important to mirror their approach.  
The organizational structures of emerging economies firms have two features which 
reinforce the importance of using this criterion. First, firms use financial vehicles to 
issue securities in international markets17. In these cases, investors price the risk 
analyzing the guarantors of the debt. Second, emerging economies firms’ have large 
non-financial affiliates incorporated all over the world, with different degrees of 
autonomy from their controlling interest18. Some are financially independent, but others 
transfer upstream their risk to other companies (most probably to their parent 
companies). Only if a non-financial affiliate’s debt is guaranteed by another company, 
we match the debt-security with the firm-level information of the latter.  
                                                          
15 There are two options: it can be an emerging economy firm, and be in our sample; alternatively, it can be an advanced economy firm, 
and be excluded from it.  
16 Standalone affiliates of advanced/emerging economies companies incorporated in an emerging/advanced economy are treated as 
emerging/advanced economies firms. Had we used the country of incorporation of the debt-issuer or the ultimate parent company, we 
would have tracked incorrectly emerging economies funding patterns. For example, Jaguar-Land Rover is a standalone affiliate 
incorporated in an advance economy (UK) with an emerging economy firm as its parent company (Tata Motors from India). Jaguar-Land 
Rover guarantees its own debt and its issuances are not included in our data base. On the contrary, Kansas City Southern de México is a 
standalone affiliate incorporated in Mexico with its parent being a US company. We then include issuances from Kansas City Southern 
de México in our data base. 
17 Table II.1 in Annex II contains a list of these financial vehicles. Some of them are ad-hoc special purpose vehicles, while others are 
financial affiliates, regularly involved in obtaining funding for their group. 
18 Table II.2 Annex II shows a list of emerging economies affiliates all over the world, which include well known trade-marks as Jaguar-
Land Rover, Vale Canada, or Novelis. 
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Chart 1 decomposes the total volume issued by emerging economies firms according to 
the country of incorporation of the debt-issuer. Debt-issued onshore refers to debt in 
which the country of the debt-issuer and the debt-guarantor coincide. In the other two 
groups, they differ. Debt-issued from offshore (financial or non-financial) centers refers 
to that issued by entities incorporated in a country different from that of the debt-
guarantor. The gap between onshore and offshore financing is a measure of the debt 
which would be improperly classified –or remain hidden- had not we introduced our 
criterion. Offshore financing accounts for 70% of total debt guaranteed by emerging 
economies firms in Emerging Europe, and close to 50% in Africa & Middle East; in 
Latin-America and Emerging Asia, it represents between 28% and 25%, respectively. 
Debt-issued from non-offshore centers is noticeable high in Africa & Middle East, and 
Emerging Asia, underscoring the importance of guarantees extended by their 
multinationals on debt-issued by foreign non-financial affiliates.   
 
Issuer of Debt
Guarantor of debt
Source: own elaboration.
Figure 1. Non-financial corporations and their guarantees on debt issued by affiliates
Parent  
Company
Supported 
affiliate
Standalone
affiliate
Debt
guaranteed 
by parent
Debt guaranted
by affi liate
Consolidated firm: defined by the 
risk of affiliates debt for the parent 
company
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Africa & Middle East Emerging Asia Emerging Europe Latin-America
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Source: Bloomberg, own elaboration.
Chart 1. Debt-Guaranteed by emerging economies by country of incorporation of the issuer
Note: Debt-issued onshore refers to debt in which the country of the debt-issuer and the debt-guarantor coincide.  Debt-issued  in offshore centers refers to 
that issued by entities incorporated in countries that are not those of the debt-guarantor.The offshore financial centres are the countries hosting financial 
vehicles from other economies: Cayman Islands, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Virgin Islands, Singapore, Isle of Man, Ireland, Marh sall Islands, Mauritius, 
Hong-Kong, Bermuda.  The offshore non-financial debt refers to the countries hosting non-financial affiliates from other economies.
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Identifying the ultimate guarantor of a debt-security is challenging. Hence, as a short-
cut, it has been proposed to obtain debt-securities issued by firms headquartered in 
emerging economies and all their affiliates, irrespective of the support they receive from 
their parent companies. On aggregate basis, this measured is referred to as the 
nationality measure. This measure is also flawed; it has two biases: there are foreign 
affiliates of emerging economies firm which are standalone entities, and should not be 
included (for example Jaguar-Land Rover from UK is an standalone affiliate of Tata 
Motors from India); there are standalone affiliates of advanced economies firm in 
emerging economies, which should be included (for example Kansas City Southern de 
Mexico from Mexico is an standalone affiliate of Kansas City Southern Lines from the 
US). 
Since these biases have opposite effects, they could offset each other and go unnoticed 
in aggregate analyses (see Annex III). Finally, the criterion proposed has another 
advantage: it provides a globally consistent breakdown of international debt among 
firms. Affiliates whose debt is not guaranteed by their parent companies are treated as 
independent entities, preventing double-counting19.  
 
3.3. Deal-level information 
Table 3 shows the total number of debt-securities issued in the period and guaranteed by 
emerging economies firms. The total is broken down by the market of issuance. The 
bulk of debt-securities guaranteed by emerging economies firms are issued in the 
Eurobond market. Though, its relative importance has decreased over time. Debt-
securities issuances in the US 144A bond market are second in importance; in the last 
year have experienced a noticeable increase. The number of debt-securities issued in 
public bond markets is, comparatively, much smaller: debt-issuances in the global bond 
markets are more frequent while foreign bonds have decreased in importance over time.  
Table 4 shows the total amount raised per year, with a similar break-down by market. 
This is a very large number –particularly so, since we are focusing on non-financial 
firms, and excluding firms from large debt-issuers as China.  
Table 5 shows the deal average size in each market. Debt issuances in global bond 
market are by far the largest (700 USD bn), and their size has increased substantially 
after the global financial crisis. Debt-issuances in US 144A bond market are second in 
size –the average deal is 360 USD bn-; followed by debt-issuances in Eurobond markets 
(on average, 232 USD bn). The smallest placements take place in foreign bond markets.   
                                                          
19 However, we acknowledge there is probably not a single best criterion to track firms’ international activity. This decision depends on 
the purpose of the analysis: what it is useful for analyses on taxation or revenue diversification can be misleading for financial stability 
analysis, and the other way around. For instance, unconsolidated analyses might be useful for research on geographical diversification of 
income revenues, or the impact of taxation on firms’ organisational structure.  
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Total 
Global Bond 
Markets
Foreign Bond 
Markets
US 144A 
Bond Markets
Eurodollar 
Bond Market
2000 163 8 11 43 101
2001 179 6 4 31 138
2002 168 14 4 34 116
2003 175 20 4 51 100
2004 293 16 7 43 227
2005 434 20 7 60 347
2006 593 27 5 36 525
2007 386 15 4 15 352
2008 104 3 5 7 89
2009 196 17 4 39 136
2010 233 15 1 38 179
2011 206 17 10 22 157
2012 247 20 3 30 194
2013 327 29 7 45 246
2014 240 22 1 105 112
Total 3944 249 77 599 3019
Table 3. Number of deals per year. Breakdown by market of issuance
Note: Foreign Bond Market include Samurai, Shogun, Yankee; and US Domestic placements 
of foreign affiliates of emerging economies firms which are guaranteed by their parent 
companies.
Total Global Bond 
Markets
Foreign 
Bond 
Markets
US 144A 
Bond 
Markets
Eurodollar 
Bond Market
2000 17.66 1.74 2.34 7.35 6.24
2001 20.69 4.22 1.31 6.92 8.24
2002 30.89 5.13 0.63 11.48 13.66
2003 36.22 9.75 0.97 14.06 11.44
2004 44.48 6.36 0.91 9.39 27.82
2005 56.41 6.64 1.31 11.55 36.91
2006 66.26 14.64 1.48 7.08 43.05
2007 82.59 7.03 1.03 4.24 70.29
2008 25.81 0.81 1.08 3.62 20.30
2009 95.70 18.25 1.53 14.65 61.27
2010 106.97 15.13 0.72 14.12 77.01
2011 108.89 20.03 2.39 11.91 74.57
2012 124.08 18.63 0.45 19.31 85.70
2013 166.61 26.94 1.26 18.78 119.63
2014 129.93 22.28 0.04 61.55 46.06
Total 1113.20 177.59 17.43 216.00 702.18
Note: Foreign Bond Market include Samurai, Shogun, Yankee; and US Domestic 
placements of foreign affiliates of emerging economies firms which are guaranteed by 
their parent companies.
Table 4. Total amount issued per year ($ bn). Breakdown by market of 
issuance.
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Chart 2 displays the total amount raised by region, and breaks it down by year. Latin-
American firms have guaranteed debt-securities for an amount of more than 600 USD 
bn; Emerging Asian firms are second in importance, and have guaranteed 250 USD bn, 
while Emerging Europe and Africa & Middle East stand as third and fourth, with a total 
of 250 and 171 USD bn.   
 
 
Finally, table 6 breaks the deals down by the country of incorporation of the debt-issuer, 
complementing information shown in chart 1. Onshore deals are those in which the 
country of incorporation coincides with the country of the guarantor; offshore deals are 
those in which they are different. Offshore deals represent 20% of the total, and their 
Total Average 
Global Bond 
Markets
Foreign Bond 
Markets
US 144A Bond 
Markets
Eurodollar 
Bond Market
2000 108.37 216.96 212.47 170.89 61.82
2001 115.58 703.22 326.29 223.30 59.72
2002 183.88 366.39 156.54 337.54 117.76
2003 206.95 487.75 242.37 275.59 114.37
2004 151.82 397.61 130.37 218.41 122.54
2005 129.99 331.84 187.74 192.56 106.37
2006 111.73 542.29 296.01 196.72 82.01
2007 213.97 468.97 256.36 282.94 199.68
2008 248.18 271.47 215.35 516.82 228.11
2009 488.26 1073.26 383.20 375.76 450.48
2010 459.09 1008.39 715.00 371.46 430.23
2011 528.60 1178.37 238.61 541.17 474.96
2012 502.36 931.55 149.78 643.54 441.73
2013 509.51 929.13 179.31 417.26 486.32
2014 543.64 1012.87 40.72 586.17 414.94
Total Average 282.32 713.22 226.31 360.60 232.67
Note: Foreign Bond Market include Samurai, Shogun, Yankee; and US Domestic placements of foreign 
affiliates of emerging economies firms which are guaranteed by their parent companies.
Table 5. Average amount issued per year  ($ mm). Breakdown by market of issuance.
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Chart 2. Debt-guaranteed by emerging economies firms. Breakdown by region.
Note: breakdown by country of risk (nationality of the firm guaranteeing the debt -security). 
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frequency has remained pretty stable over time; they represent 35% of the total amount 
raised.  
 
 
For each debt-security, we obtain details of the structure of the operation: the amount 
issued, the maturity, yield, currency of denomination, issuer-name and its country, 
guarantor-name and its country, ultimate parent company name and its country, and 
market of issuance. Besides, we obtain information on the type of security issued: if it is 
a straight bond, has embedded call or put options, has convertible rights, has a sinking 
fund, has any combination of these features (i.e., sinking fund plus call option), whether 
it is registered in the SEC (or it is a bearer bond), and so on.  
Next, we match each debt-security with the financial and non-financial information of 
the firm guaranteeing it. We use firms’ financial information to compute relevant 
financial ratios: interest coverage ratio, return on assets, current ratio, debt to equity, 
fixed assets total assets and the Altman-score, among others. The non-financial 
information includes the firm industry, total assets, number of employees, reporting 
GAAP, listing status in the local market, cross-listing in the US exchanges 
 
3.4. Firm-year database 
To examine how firms choose among the different international debt markets, we create 
a firm-year database. This adjustment is important since some firms issue debt-
securities on a delayed basis (particularly in Eurobond market), dividing their annual 
funding needs into several tranches. Treating them as different deals could introduce 
biases: deals will appear as smaller, and markets in which delayed issuance is more 
Non-Offshore 
Deals
Offshore Deals
Non-Offshore 
Amount Issued
Offshore 
Amount Issued
2000 136 27 12.14 5.53
2001 137 42 12.70 7.99
2002 117 51 18.45 12.44
2003 117 58 16.74 19.48
2004 230 63 26.92 17.56
2005 372 62 39.30 17.11
2006 538 55 48.99 17.26
2007 314 72 49.34 33.25
2008 82 22 15.46 10.35
2009 143 53 61.96 33.73
2010 165 68 71.21 35.76
2011 165 41 76.51 32.38
2012 183 64 81.12 42.96
2013 229 98 97.51 69.10
2014 198 42 110.64 19.29
Total 3126 818 739.00 374.20
Table 6. Offshore funding. Number of deals and amount issued ($ bn) of 
foreign affiliates
Note: Foreign Bond Market include Samurai, Shogun, Yankee; and US Domestic 
placements of foreign affiliates of emerging economies firms which are guaranteed by 
their parent companies.
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frequent would become overrepresented. Similar methodological decisions have been 
taken in previous research (Esho et al. (2001)). 
Thus, for each firm, we map all the debt-securities issued in a given year into a single 
observation. If a firm issues only once, the annual observation coincides with the deal-
level observation described in the previous sub-section. But if a firm issues several 
times in a given year, we need construct a single observation. We describe in Annex I 
our procedure.  
Once we have constructed a firm-level database, we classify firms according to the 
market in which they issue. Firms might issue in more than one market in a given year. 
This creates a distinction between firms issuing in a single market, and those issuing in 
at least two –the switchers-.  
There are different reasons behind a firm’ choice. Firms may choose the market to 
minimize their costs of issuance but they may also want to broaden the investor base: 
different markets attract different investors, so some firms –in particular, firms with 
large funding needs- might choose to issue in two markets to tap different pools of 
funding.  
Thus, we use the following assumption to classify firms: firms which, in a given year, 
switch between the Global bond market and the institutional/wholesale markets find 
more cost effective the public bond market and they switch to diversify their investor 
base. This assumption is sensible; there are economies of scale in issuing debt in public-
debt markets, so firms switching to institutional/wholesale securities markets will be 
looking to broaden their investor base.   
Accordingly, we classify firms in two main groups: firms able to issue in the public 
debt-securities market, and firms which cannot. The group of firms without access to 
the public debt-securities markets is further broken down in three sub-groups: firms 
issuing debt only in the US144A private debt market; firms issuing only in the 
Eurobond market, and firms issuing in both markets.  
Table 7 shows the number of firms issuing in each market by year. The total number of 
firm-year observations is 2,761; by construction, this number is smaller than the number 
of deals, underscoring that some firms issue more than one security each year (an 
average of 1.2 deals per year).  
There are 142 firms which, in a given year, are able to issue in the global bond market, 
51 firms have access to the foreign bond market, and the remaining 2,568 do not have 
access to the public debt-securities markets20. Among them, there are 2,163 firms 
which, in a given year, issue only in the Eurobond market; 311 issue only in the 
US144A bond market; and 94 accede simultaneously to both markets.   
The group of firms which have access to foreign bond markets and do not issue in the 
global bond market is small. Moreover, the Yankee market has faded since the 
enforcement of US regulation with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 (Gao 
(2011).  
 
                                                          
20 In Annex I we provide further details on switchers: there are 67 firms which, in a given year, issue simultaneously in the global bond market 
at any private debt-securities markets; these firms are larger than firms acceding only the global bond market (the non-switchers). 
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3.5. Univariate analysis. Deal characteristics and firms’ features in global and 
institutional/wholesale markets 
Next, we compare the characteristics of the deals and the type of borrowers among the 
global (public) and institutional/wholesale markets. We use descriptive statistics, kernel 
estimation, and tests of stochastic dominance. Table 8 shows descriptive statistics. All 
variables shown are firm-specific. They can be classified in two groups: firm-
information; and variables related to the type of financial contracts that firms subscribe. 
We refer to them as financial contract characteristics; they include measures of the type 
of debt-securities and are a valuable source of information of firms’ credit quality, 
which reflects how lenders assess their risk.  
Panel A reports firm-information. Firms guaranteeing debt issued in 
institutional/wholesale debt-securities markets are smaller and are less frequently cross-
listed in the US through ADR. This is consistent with our expectation: firms with more 
capacity to absorb flotation costs will issue debt in public debt markets. Firms without 
access to the global market show more severe informational asymmetries: have a lower 
proportion of fixed assets to total assets, and are more likely to report their financial 
statements using a local GAAP. 
Also, firms issuing debt only in institutional/wholesale markets seem to have weaker 
financial conditions. They show lower profitability (ROA) and less capacity to pay 
interest expenses (ICR).  Overall, firms without access to the global market show worst 
financial conditions. 
Table 7. Number of firms active in international debt markets. 
Total 
Access to 
Global Bond 
Market
Access to 
Foreign Bond 
Market
Eurodollar 
Bond 
Market
US144A 
Bond 
Market
Simultaneously 
in both
2000 116 6 8 76 18 8
2001 136 5 4 107 14 6
2002 113 10 2 80 15 6
2003 110 11 2 64 27 6
2004 218 12 5 174 18 9
2005 301 10 5 255 21 10
2006 400 10 3 370 10 7
2007 310 11 3 283 10 3
2008 88 3 4 75 5 1
2009 139 12 4 91 28 4
2010 164 8 1 125 26 4
2011 141 10 5 110 10 6
2012 152 12 0 119 14 7
2013 210 10 4 167 23 6
2014 163 12 1 67 72 11
Total 2,761 142 51 2,163 311 94
Public debt-securities markets Private debt-securities markets
Note: Firm-year observations are classified in mutually exclusive groups, depending on the market of issuance. 
Access to global bond markets includes firms which issue at least once in the global bond market; access to 
foreign bond markets includes firms which issue at least once in the foreign bond market (and do not belong to the 
previous group). As for firms without access to public debt-securities are markets, are classified in three groups: 
firms issuing only in Eurodollar, only in US144A, and firms issuing simultaneously in both.
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Panel B shows the financial contract characteristics; under this heading we include 
the features of the debt-securities issued by firms in a given year: total amount issued, 
maturity of security, existence of rating, among others. As expected, the amount issued 
by firms in the Eurobond and US144A markets is smaller. The maturity of debt is 
shorter, consistent with lower informational asymmetries. Firms are more likely to issue 
bonds with sinking funds, reflecting a perceived lower quality; and to include 
convertible rights as decreasing-value concessions to reduce their funding costs. Their 
debt-securities are less frequently rated, especially in the Eurobond market, consistent 
with the high-asymmetry of information in this market. Overall, the proportion of firms 
granting any sort of bond holder rights (sinking funds, convertible rights, or put options) 
in the global market is substantially lower. Table 8b shows the results of the tests of 
identity of distributions (continuous variables) and proportions (categorical variables) 
for the variables in table 8 among the three groups of firms. Most of the tests reject the 
null of equal distributions/proportions, implying that the three groups of firms and the 
type of bonds issued by each group have different characteristics. The tests also reject 
the null that firms issuing in the Eurobond and US144A markets are similar. This is 
important because even though both markets share common features (less regulation 
and wholesale investors), the issuers and the characteristics of the deals are not the 
same. This will be crucial when conducting the multivariate analysis. 
Firms with Access to 
Global Market
Firms Issuing only on 
Eurobond Market
Firms Issuing only on 
US144A Market
A. Firm-information
Total Assets ($ mm) 11,620 936 4,295
Fixed Assets to Total Assets 0.58 0.38 0.46
Altman Score 1.93 1.92 1.82
Leverage 2.46 2.35 2.58
Return on Assets (%) 4.38% 3.39% 3.19%
Current Ratio 1.34 1.36 1.29
Interest Coverage Ratio 3.47 2.55 2.88
Local GAAP (%) 6% 27% 20%
US ADR (%) 48% 13% 25%
B.Financial contract characteristics
Amount Issued ($ mm) 650 55 300
Maturity (years) 9.38 5.00 6.69
Sinking Fund (%) 4% 6% 18%
Convertible Rights (%) 6% 29% 6%
Call option (%) 32% 15% 38%
Put option (%) 3% 35% 4%
Rating (%) 86% 34% 76%
Bond Holder Rights (%) 9% 33% 23%
Table 8. Firm-level variables. Descriptive statistics (median values).
Note:  The table shows median values for firm-year observations.   
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Chart 3 plots the density function of a number of variables for different types of firms: 
firms with access to global bond market; firms issuing debt only in the Eurobond 
market and firms issuing debt only in the US144A market. Visual inspection suggests 
that firms with access to global bond markets are larger, have a better ratio of fixed 
assets to total assess and issue at longer maturities. These firms also have better interest 
coverage ratios and larger ROA. Firms issuing only in the Eurobond market are smaller 
and have lower ratio of fixed assets than those in the US144A market. Finally, we 
further analyze these apparent relations conducting empirical tests of stochastic 
dominance for the distributions of different variables among the three groups of firms 
(see Annex V for a description). Unlike test of equality of distributions, these tests rank 
unequivocally independent distributions; for instance, they determine if the distribution 
of firms with access to global the bond market have larger assets than the firms in any 
of the other two groups at any level of total assets. The results of the analysis are shown 
in the third column of table 9. They confirm the different features of each group of 
issuers. Firms with access to global markets are larger, have a higher fixed assets ratio 
and issue larger amounts at longer maturities. This is also true for those firms only 
issuing in the US144A market compared to firms issuing only in the Eurobond market 
(see table 9-Panel C). Regarding financial conditions, firms with access to global 
markets show better balance-sheet ratios overall. Issuers in the US144A market seem to 
have more deteriorated ratios. 
Table 8b. Tests of identity of distributions/proportions. Null is identity. (Z-values)
Global Issuers vs. 
Eurobond Issuers
Global Issuers vs. 
UA144A Issuers
Eurobond Issuers vs. 
US144A Issuers
A. Firm-information
Total Assets ($ mm)  -10.41***  -4.41*** 9.20***
Fixed Assets to Total Assets  -6.62***  -2.84*** 4.18***
Altman Score 0.71 -0.34 -1.54
Leverage -0.80 1.53 3.06***
Return on Assets (%)  -1.98*** -1.36 0.71
Current Ratio 0.30 -1.07  -2.08***
Interest Coverage Ratio  -2.76*** -1.21 1.93**
Local GAAP (%) 5.62*** 3.84***  -2.73***
US ADR (%)  -11.19***  -4.74*** 5.76***
B.Financial contract characteristics
Amount Issued ($ mm)  -12.06***  -4.82*** 14.34***
Maturity (years)  -11.24***  -4.23*** 7.88***
Sinking Fund (%) 0.73  4.02*** 8.03***
Convertible Rights (%) 5.85*** -0.23  -8.71***
Call option (%)  -5.04*** 1.35 9.70***
Put option (%)  7.84*** 0.71  -10.89***
Rating (%)  -12.45***  -2.43*** 14.21***
Bond Holder Rights (%) 5.98*** 3.60***  -3.47***
Note: Global Issuers refer to those firms with access to the global market Eurobond (US144A) issuers refer to firms issuing 
only in the eurobond (US144A) market. The table shows median values for firm-year observations. Test of identity of 
distributions: Wilkoxon rank-sum test for continuous variables; tests of equality of proportions for categorical variables. 
Table shows the z-values, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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SOURCE: Bloomberg and own calculations. 
Global: firms with access to Global market. Eurobond: Firms only issuing Eurobonds. US144a: Firms only issuing US144a bonds.
Charts show estimated kernel density functions for different periods . We use the "Epanechnikov" kernel function and the “optimal” window width (the one that
minimizes the mean integrated square error). Robustness checks using different kernel functions and window widths show similar qualitative results . To control
for the potential inuence of outliers, we exclude observations in the 1% from upper and lower tails of the distribution.
Chart 3. Kernel density function estimation
1. Total assets 2. Ratio fixed assets
3. Maturity 4. Leverage
5. Return on assets 6. Interest coverage ratio
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The analysis of the distributions of firm-level information confirms that differences in 
the type of firms acceding to each market are not random. They suggest that poorer 
credit quality, more severe informational asymmetries, and less ability to cope with high 
flotation costs, lead firms to issue in the institutional/wholesale markets. Though, we 
cannot claim causality. Differences in the distributions can stem from an unobserved 
variable. For instance, larger firms have easier access to the global bond market; if firm 
Test GLOBAL SD1 
EUROBOND
Test EUROBOND SD1 
GLOBAL
SD1 SD1
Total Assets 1.000 0.000***
Fixed Assets to Total Assets 1.000 0.000***
Altman Score 0.404 0.739
Leverage 0.123 0.005***
Return on Assets 0.915 0.018**
Current Ratio 0.561 0.806
Interest Coverage Ratio 0.771 0.004***
Amount Issued 1.000 0.000***
Maturity 1.000 0.000***
Test GLOBAL SD1 US144A 
BONDS
Test US144A BONDS SD1 
GLOBAL
SD1 SD1
Total Assets 0.997 0.000***
Fixed Assets to Total Assets 1.000 0.004***
Altman Score 0.800 0.215
Leverage 0.068** 0.816
Return on Assets 0.725 0.028**
Current Ratio 0.937 0.308
Interest Coverage Ratio 0.727 0.110
Amount Issued 0.944 0.000***
Maturity 0.916 0.000***
Test EUROBOND SD1 
US144A
Test US144A SD1 
EUROBOND
SD1 SD1
Total Assets 0.000*** 0.985
Fixed Assets to Total Assets 0.000*** 0.978
Altman Score 0.988 0.087*
Leverage 0.000*** 1.000
Return on Assets 0.093* 0.686
Current Ratio 0.986 0.059*
Interest Coverage Ratio 0.007 0.931
Amount Issued 0.000*** 0.994
Maturity 0.000*** 0.664
Source: own elaboration                                                                                                                                                                                                   
*, **, and *** denote rejecting the nul l  of SD at the s igni ficance level  of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
B- Global vs. US144A
C- Eurobond vs. US144A
EUROBOND
Table 9. Tests of stochastic dominance in EMEs NFCs. 2000-2014    (p-values)
SD1: distribution 
preferred.
GLOBAL
GLOBAL
-
A- Global vs. Eurobond
GLOBAL
-
GLOBAL
GLOBAL
GLOBAL
SD1: distribution 
preferred.
GLOBAL
GLOBAL
-
GLOBAL
GLOBAL
-
-
GLOBAL
GLOBAL
SD1: distribution 
preferred.
US144a
US144a
EUROBOND
EUROBOND
US144A
EUROBOND
US144a
US144a
US144a
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size is positively correlated with cross-listing in the US through ADR, the unconditional 
distribution can lead to erroneous inference about the impact of cross-listing on firms’ 
choices. 
The univariate analysis, although lacking any causality assessment, provides important 
information to analyze the risks for financial stability.  It shows that firms tapping 
institutional/wholesale markets have weaker financial conditions and need to introduce 
different covenants on their issuances to protect bond holders. Moreover, it shows that 
institutional/wholesale debt markets, which have increased its size remarkably after the 
global financial crisis, are populated by issuers with higher credit risk. 
 
4. Multivariate Analysis of Firms’ Choice of Market of Issuance 
In this section we investigate firms’ incremental debt choice among their existing 
options in international debt-securities markets. Conditional on their decision to issue a 
debt-security in an international market, they can choose between the global, the 
US144A, and the Eurobond markets. Thus, this exercise focuses on the marginal 
decision of firms, reporting the results of multinomial logit regressions and ordered logit 
regression. This type of estimation has already being used in previous literature 
analyzing the determinants of the debt choice (Denis and Mihov (2003), Altunbas et al. 
(2009), Esho and Sharpe (2001)). All independent variables are firm-specific. Common 
factors are captured by the intercept and the time dummies.  
 
4.1. Multinomial Logit. 
Given the results obtained from the univariate analysis we need to treat the three groups 
of firms separately and study how firms choose among the three alternative options: 
global bond market (baseline option), US144A and Eurobond markets. We fit a 
multinomial logit to do so. This specification allows for potential differences in the 
slope of the coefficient and relaxes the proportional odd ratios assumption that holds in 
an ordered logit specification. In the first model, we include only the financial 
contracting variables, and use 2,579 firm-year observations; in Table 10 we report the 
odd ratios (see table VI.1 for the coefficients). In the second model, we include the firm-
variables as well, and we use 1,193 firm-year observations. These are the main results. 
First, the decision to issue in the global bond market depends positively on the total 
amount issued; but it is not a determinant on firms’ choice for the US144A bond 
market. Not being cross-listed in the US exchanges through ADRs implies firms are 
more likely to issue securities in both the US144A and Eurobond markets. Firm size has 
a negative impact on the decision to issue in the Eurobond and in the US 144A bond 
market. Overall, flotation costs impact on firms’ choices: the amount issued, and the 
firm size, introduce a wedge between firms; those large enough will issue in the global 
bond market.  
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Second, informational asymmetries are a key factor behind firms’ choice of US144A 
and Eurobond markets; but are evident in different financial contract characteristics. 
Firms issuing unrated debt are more likely to enter the Eurobond market; this is not a 
significant factor behind firms issuing in the US144A bond market. On the other hand, 
firms granting bondholders rights (sinking fund, convertible rights, any combination of 
them and other embedded options) are more likely to enter institutional/wholesale 
markets. Bond maturities impact negatively on firms’ decision to issue debt in any of 
the two institutional/wholesale markets and the ratio of fixed assets to total assets is not 
significant. Third, firms with higher risk of financial distress are less likely to issue debt 
in the Eurobond market. This may indicate that having healthy financial ratios is more 
relevant for the small firms issuing in the Eurobond market than for the large and well-
Including Firm-Information
VARIABLES US144A Eurobond US144A Eurobond
Amount Issued 1.082 0.742***
[0.112] [0.070]
Term 0.945*** 0.925*** 0.953** 0.927***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.020] [0.021]
Local GAAP 3.375*** 3.144*** 3.323** 2.867**
[1.388] [1.206] [1.603] [1.297]
ADR 0.410*** 0.408*** 0.591* 0.489***
[0.103] [0.094] [0.164] [0.119]
MOVE Index 0.996 0.988*** 0.998 0.990*
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006]
Rated Security 0.824 0.311*** 0.477 0.148***
[0.324] [0.109] [0.273] [0.077]
Bond Holder Right 2.325** 1.682 3.776** 2.845*
[0.813] [0.543] [2.318] [1.679]
No Financial Info 1.143 1.098
[0.296] [0.264]
Market Based 1.633* 1.553* 1.794* 1.816**
[0.412] [0.365] [0.567] [0.534]
Firm Assets 0.794** 0.794**
[0.086] [0.079]
Fixed Assets to Total Assets 0.996 0.996
[0.007] [0.006]
Altman score <1.21 1.264 0.589*
[0.420] [0.184]
Constant 3.237* 601.206*** 7.115** 937.763***
[2.011] [343.495] [6.922] [856.538]
Observations 2,579 2,579 1,193 1,193
Robust standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10. Determinants of market of issuance of debt-securities. Multinomial 
Logit. Odd Ratios
Financial Contracting Features
Note: multivariate logit, base outcome is firm being able to issue in global bond market; 1 if 
firm issues only in US144A; and 2 if firm issues only in Eurobond market.
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known firms with access to the global market. The opposite happens with firms issuing 
in the USD144A market; firms with higher risk of financial distress tend to issue in that 
market although the coefficient is not significant. Market volatility makes firms less 
likely to issue in the Eurobond market. This is consistent with firms being better able to 
choose the market-timing in institutional/wholesale markets. Finally, firms are more 
likely to issue in both types of institutional/wholesale debt-securities markets after the 
global financial crisis –the market based dummy has a negative and similar impact in 
both columns.  
Table 11 shows the marginal effects for the multinomial logit. They show the change in 
the probability of issuing in a given market after a standard deviation change in 
continuous variables, and a unit change in categorical variables. By construction, the 
sum of the three changes is zero. The last row shows the baseline values, or frequency 
of firms issuing in each of these markets.  
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Table 11. Marginal Effects in Multinomial Logit
Panel A. Financial Contracting Features Panel B. Including Firm-Information
Global Bond US 144A Eurobond Market Global Bond US 144A Eurobond Market
Local GAAP -3.87% 1.64% 2.23% Local GAAP -5.35% 3.26% 2.09%
0.00 0.37 0.24 0.00 0.26 0.49
ADR 4.66% -1.03% -3.63% ADR 4.37% 1.23% -5.61%
0.00 0.50 0.06 0.00 0.60 0.03
Rated Security 3.92% 8.25% -12.18% Rated Security 7.19% 13.78% -20.97%
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bond Holder Right -2.36% 3.79% -1.42% Bond Holder Right -5.25% 5.54% -0.29%
0.03 0.05 0.48 0.01 0.10 0.94
Market Based -0.47% 0.49% -0.02% Market Based -4.07% 1.83% 2.24%
0.66 0.73 0.99 0.02 0.44 0.42
No FS Information -2.01% 0.95% 1.06% Altman score <1.21 2.09% 8.51% -10.60%
0.04 0.53 0.54 0.33 0.01 0.00
Amount 1.89% 7.70% -9.59% Total Assets 3.15% 1.60% -4.74%
0.08 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.29 0.01
Maturity 1.60% 0.50% -2.10% Maturity 2.24% 1.30% -3.54%
0.00 0.42 0.01 0.00 0.22 0.01
MOVE Index 1.23% 1.51% -2.74% MOVE Index 1.22% 1.89% -3.11%
0.02 0.03 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.02
Fixed Assets to Total Assets 0.65% -0.09% -0.57%
0.48 0.94 0.66
Baseline Values 5.47% 11.79% 82.75% Baseline Values 8.05% 14.67% 77.28%
Note: marginal effects computed on binary changes in categorical variables; and one-standard deviation in continuous variables.
p-values of the test change is 0 reported below the marginal effects.
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4.2.Ordered Logit: Eurobond, US144A and Global bond markets  
The multinomial logit do not establishes any order between the different alternatives, 
and now we now want to investigate if there is a pecking order in transparency of 
information.  Thus, we fit an ordered logit defining the global bond market as the base 
outcome, the one where firms provide more public information. The other two options 
are the US 144A bond market and the Eurobond market, being the former the one in 
which information is less public. The ordered logit has a critical assumption: the 
coefficients are equivalent in the three potential bivariate estimations; thus, it imposes 
such restriction on the coefficients, minimizing the number of parameters estimated. 
This is so-called parallel regression assumption. It is potentially restrictive as it implies 
that odd ratios do not change, and slope coefficients are identical in all three options. 
 
Table 12 shows the results for the specification including only the financial contracting 
variables; Table 13 expands the analysis and includes firm-information. We find that the 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Amount Issued -0.338*** -0.405*** -0.405*** -0.354***
[0.050] [0.057] [0.057] [0.052]
Term -0.050*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.050***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Local GAAP 0.260* 0.161 0.160 0.274*
[0.149] [0.160] [0.163] [0.153]
ADR -0.427*** -0.336** -0.335** -0.418***
[0.147] [0.148] [0.148] [0.147]
MOVE Index -0.010*** -0.010** -0.010** -0.009***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.002]
Rated Security -0.934*** -0.807*** -0.803*** -0.960***
[0.178] [0.181] [0.189] [0.188]
Bond Holder Right 0.010 -0.066
[0.153] [0.154]
No Financial Info -0.005 0.124 0.124 0.020
[0.135] [0.139] [0.139] [0.138]
Market Based 0.157
[0.148]
First Cut Point -6.454*** -5.817*** -5.813*** -6.386***
[0.321] [0.569] [0.570] [0.334]
Second Cut Point -5.008*** -4.274*** -4.270*** -4.938***
[0.308] [0.568] [0.569] [0.320]
Observations 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579
Time Dummies NO YES YES NO
Test Cut Points -11.46 -10.09 -10.08 -11.32
Z-Value 0.62 1.13 1.14 0.65
LR Chi2 407.3 534.5 534.7 409.9
Prob>CHi2 0 0 0 0
Table 12. Ordered Logit. Eurodollar, US144A and Global Bond Markets
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note:  ordered logit, base outcome is firm is able to issue in global bond market; 1 if issues 
144A bond market; 2 in Eurodollar bond market.
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less able to cope with high flotation costs a firm is, the more probable they opt to access 
institutional/wholesale markets (negative sign of amount issued); and firms with higher 
asymmetries of information will head towards less public markets (Local GAAP, term, 
rated security).  
 
Next, we run tests of model specification. First we run a test of identity of the cut points 
(also known as thresholds). The test does not reject the null hypothesis is that the two 
cut points identified are different. Though, the brant tests reject the parallel regression 
assumption. All together, the results suggest the three choices are different: US 144A 
and Eurobond markets are two different options firms have available. Though, the 
differences between the US 144A and Eurobond markets are not constant across 
variables: the results of the brant tests suggest the slope coefficients are different in the 
bivariate logits; the restrictions on coefficients imposed by the ordered logit are too 
restrictive. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Firm Assets -0.182*** -0.193*** -0.130*** -0.144*** -0.140***
[0.041] [0.045] [0.051] [0.048] [0.050]
Term -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.064*** -0.056*** -0.056***
[0.016] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017]
Local GAAP 0.193 0.118 0.108 0.187 0.189
[0.175] [0.186] [0.197] [0.184] [0.184]
ADR -0.436*** -0.337** -0.345** -0.427*** -0.432***
[0.154] [0.155] [0.159] [0.158] [0.160]
MOVE Index -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.007** -0.007**
[0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.003]
Rated Security -1.397*** -1.444*** -1.392*** -1.391*** -1.380***
[0.221] [0.231] [0.233] [0.225] [0.227]
Bond Holder Right -0.168 -0.045 0.097 -0.005 -0.000
[0.201] [0.206] [0.221] [0.225] [0.225]
Market Based 0.326* 0.309
[0.189] [0.192]
Altman score <1.21 -0.352** -0.407*** -0.391**
[0.155] [0.151] [0.157]
Fixed assets to Total Assets -0.001
[0.004]
First Cut Point -6.381*** -6.185*** -5.909*** -5.903*** -5.872***
[0.406] [0.703] [0.800] [0.470] [0.483]
Second Cut Point -5.066*** -4.779*** -4.445*** -4.535*** -4.504***
[0.397] [0.703] [0.799] [0.460] [0.473]
Observations 1,536 1,536 1,195 1,195 1,193
Time Dummies NO YES YES NO NO
LR Chi2 246.0 349.4 262.1 170.1 170.3
Prob>CHi2 0 0 0 0 0
Brant 0.00150 3.61e-09 8.91e-08 0.00578 0.0101
Table 13. Ordered Logit.  Including Firm-Information. Eurodollar, US144A and 
Global Bond Markets
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note:  ordered logit, base outcome is firm is able to issue in global bond market; 1 if issues 144A bond 
market; 2 in Eurodollar bond market.
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A.Financial Contracting Features B.Including Financial Ratios
Global Bond US 144A Eurobond Market Global Bond US 144A Eurobond Market
Local GAAP -1.25% -1.88% 3.13% Local GAAP -1.27% -1.49% 2.76%
0.06 0.07 0.06 0.29 0.31 0.30
ADR 2.20% 3.06% -5.26% ADR 3.10% 3.55% -6.65%
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Rated Security 4.09% 7.31% -11.40% Rated Security 7.62% 11.78% -19.40%
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bond Holder Right 0.33% 0.46% -0.79% Bond Holder Right 0.00% 0.00% -0.01%
0.67 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00
Market Based -0.10% -0.14% 0.24% Market Based -2.17% -2.41% 4.58%
0.88 0.89 0.89 0.12 0.10 0.10
No Financial Statement -0.76% -1.07% 1.83% Altman score <1.21 2.76% 3.07% -5.83%
0.29 0.28 0.28 0.02 0.01 0.01
Amount 4.42% 4.98% -9.40% Firm Assets 2.55% 2.55% -5.10%
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Maturity 1.15% 1.52% -2.67% Maturity 2.09% 2.13% -4.22%
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MOVE Index 1.21% 1.60% -2.81% MOVE Index 1.36% 1.43% -2.79%
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.04
Fixed Assets to Total Assets 0.18% 0.20% -0.38%
0.77 0.77 0.77
Baseline Values 6% 12% 83% Baseline Values 8% 15% 77%
Note: marginal effects computed on binary changes in categorical variables; and one-standard deviation in continuous variables.
p-values of the test change is 0 reported below the marginal effects.
Table 14. Marginal Effects in Ordered Logit
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Table 14 reports the marginal effects. By construction, the change in the probability of 
choosing the outer options (Global bond market, as the more public debt-market; and 
Eurobond market, as the less public debt-market) have opposite signs, and the sign of 
the inner option –the US 144A bond market- is uncertain; and the sum of the three 
changes is zero. When the ability to absorb flotation cost improves (larger amount, 
existence of an ADR), the probability that a firm chooses the US144A bond market 
increases; similarly, if informational asymmetries decrease (rated securities, maturities, 
bond-holder rights, local GAAP) firms switch from the Eurobond to the US144A 
market. An increase in firms’ risk of financial distress (Altman score below 1.21) has a 
similar impact: the probability that a firm chooses the Eurobond market decreases at the 
expenses of the US144A. Overall, this suggests a migration of firms from the Eurobond 
market to the inner option; this way confirming that US144A and Eurobond are more 
akin between them, than US144A and global bond markets are. 
 
4.3.Generalized ordered logit. 
In the previous section we found that the brant tests reject the parallel regression 
assumption of the ordered logit. This assumption states that the odd-ratios are constant 
across all alternatives –i.e., there is a single set of coefficients for all covariates. The 
rejection of this hypothesis suggests that the restrictions of the ordinal logit model are 
too stringent. Though, this does not rule out the existence of an ordinal raking between 
the three primary bond markets. To investigate this possibility, we fit a generalized 
ordered logit. This estimation method does not impose ex-ante any restriction on the 
coefficients between the different choices; it tests their existence, estimating restricted 
and unrestricted models sequentially for each of the variables. Overall, the estimator is 
flexible enough to nest the multinomial and the ordinal models as particular cases. The 
results are shown in table 14. Marginal effects are shown in table 15. In the first model, 
we do not include firms’ financial variables (columns 1 and 2). 
The results suggest that the differences between the odd-ratios of Global bond issuers 
and US144A issuers with respect to Eurobond issuers are related to the cost of fulfilling 
with the reporting standards of US public offerings. More formally, the iterative 
estimation identifies that the parallel regression assumption does not hold for maturity, 
local GAAP, and ADR21. When including balance-sheet variables, the restrictions are 
not imposed on local GAAP and total assets. Overall, the results show that the ranking 
between the three primary markets is not linear in several dimensions related with 
informational asymmetries and ability to cope with regulatory requirements of public 
offerings. Indeed, global issuers are identified as more different than the joint group of 
US144A and Eurobond issuers. More specifically, having a local GAAP makes unlikely 
than a firm issues in the Global bond market; it does not make a difference, when it 
comes to explain the choice between US144A and Eurobond. Similarly, the effect of 
ADR decreases: it is quite important in explaining the choice between Global and the 
other markets; less so for the choice between US144A and Eurobonds. And, when we 
include financial ratios, we find a similar effect for total assets.  
                                                          
21 Overall, the generalized ordered model estimates 13 parameters; it is more parsimonious than the 
multinomial model (which estimates 21), and less so than the ordinal model (which has just 11, at the cost 
of imposing restrictive relations between them) 
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Marginal effects –shown in table 16- synthesize these differences. Filing with a local 
GAAP, or having ADR, decreases the chances of issuing in the global bond market. 
However, the odds of issuing in US144A and Eurobond markets are not evenly split: having a 
local GAAP increases the chances of issuing through rule 144A –and less so the Eurobond 
market.
Table 15. Generalized Ordered Logit
Global US144A Global US144A
Amount Issued -0.237*** -0.237***
(0.000) (0.000)
Maturity (years) -0.0756*** -0.0526*** -0.0513*** -0.0513***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Local GAAP 1.347*** 0.114 1.254** 0.0121
(0.000) (0.471) (0.004) (0.950)
ADR (cross-listed in US) -0.962*** -0.363* -0.480** -0.480**
(0.000) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
MOVE Index -0.00895*** -0.00895*** -0.00539 -0.00539
(0.000) (0.000) (0.125) (0.125)
RatedSecurity -1.241*** -1.241*** -1.396*** -1.396***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bond Holder Rights 0.216 0.216 -0.165 -0.165
(0.127) (0.127) (0.331) (0.331)
Post 2009 0.0691 0.0691 0.312 0.312
(0.616) (0.616) (0.090) (0.090)
No Financial Information -0.0167 -0.0167
(0.898) (0.898)
Total Assets -0.311*** -0.127*
(0.000) (0.016)
Altman score below 1.23 -0.372* -0.372*
(0.014) (0.014)
Fixed Assets to Total Assets -0.00157 -0.00157
(0.671) (0.671)
Constant 6.125*** 4.373*** 7.295*** 4.464***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations
chi2
p
df_m
p-values in parentheses, * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01, ***  
12
Model 1 Model 2
Note: in the first model  the coefficients for which the paralel regression assumption is 
not imposed are maturity, local GAAP and ADR; in the second total assets and local 
GAAP. To identify the variables with the unrestricted parameters, we employ the 
iterative process of testing logit models with restricted coefficients and testing the 
2597
461.6
3.26e-91
12
1227
221.2
1.35e-40
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4.4.Robustness checks 
 
As we mentioned when analyzing the decision of issuing debt, firms may choose to tap 
less regulated markets due to the speed of issuance or the need to diversify their funding 
sources, even though they are able to cope with the regulatory requirements imposed by 
a public offering. We take into account these circumstances by excluding firms which 
have ever issued a global bond in our sample from the US144a or Eurobond issuers. 
Indeed, these firms might be still subject to ongoing disclosure requirements due to 
previous global bond issues. Many of the features which make them able to comply 
with regulatory requirements are likely to hold over time –reporting GAAP, existence of 
a US ADR. The results are robust to the exclusion of these firms, consistent with our 
priors (see table VI.2 in the Appendix). 
 
We also examine the differences between the two types of firms which have access to 
the Global bond market: the switchers and non-switchers. We have argued that 
switchers should be classified as firms which access to the Global bond market. We 
conjecture that fact that simultaneously  issuing in another market is related to their 
other advantages –as described above, speed of issuance, bespoke financing conditions, 
funding diversification-, and not to a sudden or temporary inability to issue in the 
Table 16. Robustness checks. Multinomial Logit. Generalized Ordered Logit. Marginal Effects
Global US144A Eurobond Global US144A Eurobond
Local GAAP -4.32% 2.99% 1.33% -5.89% 6.30% -0.40%
0.00 0.09 0.47 0.00 0.02 0.89
ADR 5.14% -0.55% -4.59% 3.26% 4.25% -7.51%
0.00 0.71 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rated Security 4.73% 10.44% -15.17% 6.90% 12.80% -19.70%
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bond Holder Right -1.03% -1.63% 2.66% 0.95% 1.20% -2.15%
0.14 0.13 0.14 0.38 0.38 0.38
Market Based -0.31% -0.51% 0.82% -2.08% -2.58% 4.66%
0.62 0.62 0.62 0.09 0.08 0.08
Infrastructure Firm -0.41% -0.66% 1.07% -3.93% -5.38% 9.31%
0.59 0.59 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00
No Financial Statement 0.07% 0.11% -0.18%
0.91 0.91 0.91
Altman score <1.21 3.44% 4.27% -7.71%
0.00 0.00 0.00
Amount 2.49% 3.62% -6.10%
0.00 0.00 0.00
Maturity 1.63% 1.17% -2.79% 1.77% 2.09% -3.86%
0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MOVE Index 1.11% 1.70% -2.81% 1.00% 1.22% -2.23%
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.10
Firm assets 6.10% -1.21% -4.89%
0.00 0.48 0.01
Fixed assets to total assets 0.67% 0.82% -1.49%
0.27 0.26 0.26
Baseline Values 5.56% 11.82% 82.63% 8.12% 14.50% 77.38%
Panel B. Including Financial Ratios
Note: in the first model, the coefficients for which the paralel regression assumption is not imposed are maturity, local GAAP, 
and ADR; in the second, total assets and local GAAP
Panel A. Financial Contract Features
Global bond market. Consistent with our expectations, the non-parametric analysis 
suggests that switchers are larger and sounder than non-switchers (tableVI.3. in the 
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Appendix). They are statistically different in some dimensions: larger size, higher ratio 
of fixed assets to total assets, higher profitability, and better Altman score. Though, they 
seem to invest less, signaling they are more mature companies.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have investigated how non-financial borrowers of emerging economies 
choose among the existing international bond markets: global, US144A, and Eurobond 
markets.  First, we have shown that monitoring the entities guaranteeing the debt-
securities is key to prevent biases. Thus, to carry out the analysis, we have matched data 
on debt-securities, with the corresponding firm-level information on the firm-
guaranteeing it. This way we have accomplished a comprehensive database of 3,944 
debt-securities and over 1.2 USD trillion.  
We have discussed how the regulation of international debt markets is uneven: global 
and foreign bond markets are strictly regulated; the regulation of the US 144A and in 
particular the Eurobond market is much lighter.  The results of univariate and 
multivariate analyses confirm corporate finance theory predictions: firms of poorer 
credit quality, less ability to absorb high flotation costs, and exhibiting more 
informational asymmetries, tend to issue in the less regulated debt markets. This implies 
that credit risks are more severe in the US144A and the Eurobond markets. Moreover, 
the propensity to issue in these markets has increased after the global financial crisis. 
This can reflect the reduction in liquidity in public debt markets after the global 
financial crisis.  
These results have far-reaching policy implications. They suggest that there is a two-tier 
system of regulation in international debt markets. The sizable regulatory gap implies 
that only very large and sound firms, with low informational asymmetries, find 
convenient to issue in public bond markets. Reforms aimed at making easier the access 
to public debt markets could be helpful. Local regulators could enhance firms’ access to 
global bond markets by converging towards international reporting standards. 
Regulators in key jurisdictions could collaborate to reduce the costs that issuing in the 
public bond market has for foreign firms.    
This paper leaves unanswered some questions for further research. A first one has to do 
with the role of local debt markets. The development of local bond markets could either 
foster or restrain the access to international debt markets. Well-developed local bond 
markets reduce the need to obtain external financing. But they imply more familiarity 
with bond-financing, and thus could ease access to external markets. Moreover, if local 
markets are developed, regulators could have very demanding country-specific 
regulation -such as a local reporting GAAP; thus, local firms might find costly to raise 
funds in the fully-regulated international debt markets, and head towards the Eurobond 
market. The second question has to do with advanced economies firms and their access 
to international debt markets. Do they follow the same pattern?  These economics differ 
in the stringency of local surveillance, legal systems, and institutions. More stringent 
local surveillance could imply less reliance in regulated debt markets. However, firms in 
advanced economies might have easier access to these markets, due to lower 
informational asymmetries, better legal systems and institutions. At the end of the day, 
these are empirical questions which deserve further analyses. Answering them is key to 
understand the risks that market-based financing poses for global financial stability.     
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Annex I. Data appendix 
A. Distribution of credit risks. Firm-level data 
Chart I.1 shows the distribution of credit risks in international debt markets for six 
variables: the industry-adjusted leverage, ROA, and current ratio; the Altman score, 
maturity of debt issuances, and ratio of fixed asset to total assets.  
 
Note: each chart shows the kernal of the corresponding variable, for all firms in our sample (using the firm-level database, as described in section 
3.4). We overlay a normal density function, generated using the same mean and standard deviation using 90.000 replications.
Chart I.1. Distribution of firms active in international debt markets, by category.
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All variables are winsorized at percentiles 1 and 99. We overlay a normal-density 
function. Density functions are non-normal and exhibit dispersion. In the case of 
leverage and current ratio, they are highly asymmetric, since the variable is censored at 
zero; density functions are slightly skewed to the left for the ROA and the Altman 
score. In the case of the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, the function is highly 
mesokurtic, underscoring fat tails.  
B.  Description of variables 
Table I.1 describes the firm-level variables. The information is obtained using 
Bloomberg; the ultimate source are the financial statements filed by firms.  
 
Table I.2. summarizes the deal-level variables. A key variable is the Ticker Parent: it is 
the fundamental company ticker associated to each security, and identifies the company 
guaranteeing it. It need not be the issuer company, nor the ultimate parent company of 
the issuer. All firm-level variables listed in table I.1 are obtained for this company.    
Variable Description
Total Assets Logarithm of total assets
Altman Score
We compute the Altman score for private companies: 
0.717*x1+0.847*x2+3.107*x3+0.42*x4+0.998*x5; where x1 is working 
capital to total assets, x2 is retained earnings to total assets, x3 is EBITDA 
to total assets, x4 is  book value of equity to total debt, x5 is sales revenue 
to total assets.
Dummy Altman <1.21
Binary variable takes value 1 if the firm has an Altman score lower than 
1.21
Fixed Assets to Total Assets Winsorized at percentiles 1% and 99%
Leverage
Leverage is Total Assets to Common Equity. We winsorize it at 
percentiles 1% and 99%. Deviation with respect to the worlwide industry-
median; industry defined using Bloomberg Industries.
Return on Assets 
ROA is EBITDA to Assets. We winsorize it at percentiles 1% and 99%. 
Deviation with respect to the worlwide industry-median; industry defined 
using Bloomberg Industries.
Current Ratio
Current ratio is the ratio of liquid assets to toWinsorized at percentiles 1% 
and 99%. Deviation with respect to the worlwide industry-median; industry 
defined using Bloomberg Industries.
Interest Coverage Ratio
Winsorized at percentiles 1% and 99%. Deviation with respect to the 
worlwide industry-median; industry defined using Bloomberg Industries.
Accounting Standard
Categorical variable with firm accounting standard. We construct a binary 
variable takes value 1 if the firm reports using a local GAAP (all GAAPs 
excluding US GAAP and IFRS are considered local).
US ADR 
Categorical variable which describes the US exchanges in which a firm is 
cross listed. We construct a binary variable taking value 1 if the firm is 
cross-listed in a US exchange (excluding OTC exchanges).
Listing Status Binary variables takes value 1 if the firm is listed in a local exchange. 
Source: own elaboration. 
Table I.1. Description of firm-level variables
Note: variables are accedded using Bloomberg; ultimate source are financial statements filed by firms. 
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C. Construction of the firm-year database 
We carry out the analysis for firm-year observations. Firms can issue more than once in 
a given year; and can issue in more than one market. Thus, we need to take some 
methodological decisions. First, we sum the total amount issued by each firm in a given 
year. Next, in the case of continuous variables (firm-level and deal-level), we compute 
the simple average. In the case of firm-level categorical variables (industry, reporting 
GAAP, listing status, etc), we keep them as reported; they do not change in a given 
year. However, firms might issue debt-securities with different features. Thus, deal-
level categorical variables (embedded options, sinking funds, etc) can change. To 
characterize the financial contracting characteristics of a firm, we use the following 
criterion: if a firm issues more than one security in a given year, we consider the firm 
issues debt with feature X only if all deals have that feature. If the firm fails to include 
such rights in at least one of the securities issued in a given year, we consider the firm 
does not obtain funding using feature X.   
D. Descriptive statistics of firms issuing simultaneously in the global bond market 
and any private-debt securities markets.  
In this paper we have considered that firms which, in a given year, issue in both the 
Global bond market and the private debt market find more cost effective the first one. 
We have argued that they switch to diversify their investor base. Accordingly, we have 
classified firms in two main groups: firms able to issue in the public debt-securities 
market, and firms which cannot. In table I.3 we describe switchers, replicating table 3 of 
Variable Description
Amount Issued ($ mm) Logarithm of the amount issued
Maturity (years) Maturity of the debt-security in years
Sinking Fund Binary variable takes value 1 if the debt-security has a sinking fund
Convertible Rights
Binary variable takes value 1 if the debt-security grants convertible 
rights
Call option
Binary variable takes value 1 if the debt-security has an embedded call 
option.
Put option
Binary variable takes value 1 if the debt-security has an embedded put 
option.
Bond Holder Rights
Binary variable takes value 1 if the debt-security protects bond holders 
by having any of the following features: convertible rights, sinking fund; 
any combination of options including at least convertible rights or 
sinking funds. 
Rating Binary variable for securities which are rated
Country of risk
Categorical variable: ISO code of the issuer's country of risk, computed 
using four factors: management location, country of primary listing, 
country of revenue and reporting currency. 
Country of incorporation
Categorical variable: ISO code of the country of incorporation of the 
issuer. 
Country of ultimate parent company
Categorical variable: ISO code of the country of domicile of the 
ultimate parent company.
Market of Issuance
Categorical variable taking values Eurodollar, US144A, Global, 
Yankee, Samurai, Bulldog, Shogun, US Domestic.
Currency of denomination Currency in which the debt-security is issued. 
Ticker Parent
Fundamental company ticker underlying each debt-security. This ticker 
identifies the firm guaranteeing the debt-security.
Source: own elaboration. 
Table I.2. Description of deal-level variables
Note: variables are accedded using Bloomberg; ultimate source are debt-securities prospectus. 
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the main text; and comparing them with firms which only issue in the public market. 
Switcher are larger than non-switchers, they raise larger amounts of funds, and have 
better credit-risk measures.  
 
E. Credit risk analysis: industry-adjusted financial ratios  
Table I.4 classifies firms according to its industry:  Materials, Consumer Discretionary, 
Consumer Staples, Energy, Financial, Health Care, Technology, Utilities. Financial 
ratios (leverage, ROA, current ratio) might differ across industries due to operational 
issues. Thus, it is inappropriate to compare firms of different industries. Following 
standard credit risk techniques, we construct industry-adjusted financial ratios, defined 
as deviations with respect to its industry median. These annual industry medians are 
obtained using the worldwide population of firms of each industry, irrespective of their 
country (also include advanced economies firms); and their activity in international debt 
markets (including as well firms inactive in debt markets). By using this external 
population of firms, we gauge firms’ absolute vulnerability/strength: all emerging 
economies firms of a given industry could be in good/bad position in a given year.    
Table I.3. Firms with access to global bond markets: switchers and non-switchers
Switchers Non-Switchers
A. Firm-Level Information
Total Assets 12,153 9,768
Fixed Assets to Total Assets 53.32 55.17
Altman Score 1.28 1.10
Leverage 2.21 2.24
Return on Assets 5.86 4.82
Current Ratio 1.49 1.34
Interest Coverage Ratio 4.65 3.38
Local GAAP (%) 6.1% 8.0%
US ADR (%) 57.6% 49.3%
B.Financing Conditions
Amount Issued 1,000 376
Maturity 9.75 9.29
Sinking Fund (%) 0% 2.7%
Convertible Rights (%) 0% 2.7%
Call option (%) 18% 30.7%
Put option (%) 0% 0.0%
Rating (%) 100% 76%
Bond Holder Rights (%) 0% 16%
Note: firms with access to global bond markets are broken down in the groups: switchers 
are firms which also issue in any private debt-securities markets; non-switchers are firms 
which only issue in the global bon dmarket.
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Panel A.Number of Firms
Public Debt-
Securities Markets
Private Debt-
Securities Markets
US 144A Market Eurodollar Market
27 310 46 249
Communications 38 325 36 276
ConsumerDiscretionary 5 388 32 345
ConsumerStaples 12 275 36 231
Energy 25 231 57 163
Financial 0 15 4 10
HealthCare 0 68 3 65
Industrial 21 557 45 498
Technology 2 154 8 145
Utilities 12 213 42 151
Panel B.Amount Issued
Public Debt-
Securities Markets
Private Debt-
Securities Markets
US 144 Market Eurodollar Market
Materials 26,865 126,440 22,270 92,243
Communications 67,361 76,302 15,110 48,082
ConsumerDiscretionary 1,729 61,358 11,205 43,634
ConsumerStaples 8,550 69,354 12,994 48,169
Energy 161,255 232,958 42,472 171,180
Financial 0 4,619 775 3,144
HealthCare 0 5,028 183 4,845
Industrial 15,242 103,808 15,486 77,868
Technology 460 8,242 1,863 5,295
Utilities 9,237 102,154 21,125 63,621
Note: firms classified using Bloomberg Industries sectoral grouping. 
Table I.4. Number of firms and amount issued by industries
F. Data gaps in firms’ financial statements information 
Our database contains information on unlisted firms (private companies). This sets it 
apart from some traditional data sources for the analysis of firms’ balance-sheets, such 
Thomson Reuters WorldScope and S&P Capital IQ’s Compustat Global. These 
databases cover between 90%-95% of global market capitalization and they also 
provide historical data on inactive publicly held companies (those which have merged, 
liquidated or become privately held)22. They offer almost no information on unlisted 
firms.  
Unlike these traditional data sources, we have firm-information for some non-listed 
firms. Table I.5 shows the coverage. It is better for firms issuing debt-securities in 
public debt-markets, but remains good enough in US144A and Eurobond markets. 
Besides, we have financial contract characteristics for all firms. In all estimations, we 
have controlled for the potential biases of lacking firm-information, and our findings are 
robust.   
                                                          
22 They have been used in a number of recent studies on firms’ soundness (for instance, IMF (2014A, 2014B, 2014C), Morgan Stanley 
(2013)).  
 
Public Debt-
Securities Markets
Institutional/Wholesale 
Markets
US 144A 
Market
Eurodollar Market
Firm-information 77.46% 58.61% 62.06% 57.84%
Firms listed in local exchanges 57.75% 50.78% 52.41% 50.49%
Source: own elaboration
Table I.5. Data Gaps in Firm-information. Percentage of firms with data. 
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Annex II. Firms guarantees on affiliates’ debt-securities: the identification of 
upstream transfers of risks 
In this paper we have collected the debt-securities guaranteed by emerging economies 
firms; and match them with the financial and non-financial information of the firms 
guaranteeing them. We have argued this is key to analyze the actual financial risks that 
investors assume by acquiring these securities.  
Implementing this criterion requires identifying transfers of risk from debt-issuers to 
debt-guarantors. But, how can such upstream transfers of risk be identified, in practice?  
The main input is the fundamental company ticker underlying each debt-security. This 
ticker identifies the firm guaranteeing the debt-security; it need not coincide with the 
issuer-firm, nor with the ultimate parent company of the issuer-firm. The country of 
incorporation of the debt-guarantor firm is equivalent to the country-risk of the debt-
security. This is an ISO code constructed using four factors listed in order of 
importance: management location, country of primary listing, country of revenue, and 
reporting currency of the issuer. In practical terms, the primary listing status and 
managerial location are key to determine the holder of the risk, while the reporting 
currency is the least important factor. As a robustness check, we have cross-checked our 
conclusion using firms’ financial reports.  
Using this method, we identify two types of upstream transfers of risk. Firstly, transfers 
of risk of financial vehicles; these entities are used to tap international markets and are 
often referred to as “offshore vehicles” since most are incorporated overseas. Table II.1 
lists some recent deals in which emerging economies firms have tapped international 
markets through offshore financial vehicles. They include debt securities issuances by 
Petrobras Global Finance, Lukoil International Finance BV, or AngloGold Ashanti 
Holdings PLC, among others. A way of confirming that there is a transfer of risk is 
comparing the country of risk of these securities with the country of the ultimate parent 
company, which coincides. This reflects that these entities are always explicitly 
guaranteed by their parent companies, and so it is the debt they issue. The debt is 
guaranteed by emerging economies firms. Entities issuing these debt securities are, 
though, incorporated in advanced economies such as Netherlands, Luxembourg, or 
Ireland. Thus, these deals would not be included in analyses of debt-issued by emerging 
economies firms, since these financial vehicles are domiciled in advanced economies. 
Like-wise, in all these deals the direct issuer belongs to the financial sector; they could 
be improperly classified as debt issued by financial firms.  
 
Company Name Parent Company Country of 
Incorporation
Country of Risk Country of Ultimate 
Parent Company
CUSIP Amount
(US bn)
Petrobras Global Finance BV PETROBRAS - PETROLEO 
BRAS-PR
Netherlands Brazil Brazil 71647NAF6 3.5
Lukoil International Finance BV LUKOIL OAO Netherlands Russia Russia EJ6431419 1.5
Gazprom Neft OAO Via GPN 
Capital SA
GAZPROM NEFT OAO-CLS Luxemburg Russia Russia EJ9515473 1.5
Russian Railways via RZD Capital 
PLC
RUSSIAN RAILWAYS JSC Ireland Russia Russia EJ6158582 1.308
AngloGold Ashanti Holdings PLC ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LTD Isle of Man South Africa South Africa 03512TAD3 1.25
Metalloinvest Finance Ltd METALLOINVEST HOLDING 
CO OAO
Ireland Russia Russia EJ8456547 1
SABIC Capital II BV SAUDI BASIC INDUSTRIES 
CORP
Netherland Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia EJ8456547 1
Source: Bloomberg, own elaboration.
Table II.1. International debt securities issuances by offshore financial vehicles
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Secondly, non-financial affiliates can also transfer upstream risk to their parent 
companies. This happens when their debt is guaranteed by its parent companies. Albeit 
less frequent, this is not rare. Table 4 lists a number of debt securities issuances in 
which the risk of non-financial affiliate’s debt issuances is transferred to parent 
companies. There are relevant examples. For instance, JBS Investment GmbH is an 
Austrian affiliate of a Brazilian company, whose debt is guaranteed by its parent 
company, JBS S.A; therefore the risks are transferred upstream to Brazil. Rolta LLC is a 
US affiliate of an Indian firm, Rolta India, which guarantees its debt; similarly, the risk 
is transferred to its parent. 
 
These transfers of risk can be sizable. In some companies, most of the international 
debt-securities they guarantee have been issued by affiliates incorporated overseas. We 
show two relevant examples in figure 2, Petroleos Brasileiros SA (Petrobras), and Vale 
SA. For each company, the chart shows a stylized organizational structure, the 
outstanding guaranteed debt, broken down by issuer entity; we show as well the country 
of incorporation of each entity. 
The bulk of the debt securities guaranteed by Petrobras have been issued by its offshore 
financial affiliates: PiFcO and Petrobras Global Finance.  The outstanding volume of 
the Global Notes issued by PiFcO amounts for 26.9 bn US$; outstanding debt securities 
issued by Petrobras Global Finance BV reaches 15 bn US$. Petrobras guarantees all 
debt issued by these financial vehicles. This transfer of risk is also explicit in the 
prospectus which Petrobras’ affiliates file with the SEC when they issue debt-securities. 
PGF issues debt securities using shelf registration; in the Rule 424(b) Prospectus 
Supplement filed in January 2015, PGF Netherlands is described as a company whose 
business is “to issue debt securities in the international capital markets to finance 
Petrobras’ operations.”23; the securities issued by PGF are described as “fully and 
unconditionally guaranteed by Petrobras”. This is an example in which the entities 
issuing the debt –Petrobras’ affiliates PiFcO and PGF-, and the entity holding the risk –
the parent company, Petrobras-, do not coincide. 
Vale SA, the large mining Brazilian company, constitutes a second example. Panel B 
shows that the bulk of its debt securities has been issued by Vale Overseas Ltd, an 
offshore vehicle domiciled in the Cayman Islands. Vale SA has a large non-financial 
affiliate in Canada, Vale Canada Ltd (Canada’s second largest mining company); 
despite not being very active in international debt markets, it has two outstanding debt 
securities, which amount for 0.400 USD bn. Finally, Vale SA owns Samarco, the 
Company Name Parent Company Country of 
Incorporation
Country of Risk Country of Ultimate 
Parent Company
CUSIP Amount (US bn)
JBS Investment GmbH JBS SA Austria Brazil Brazil 46611DAA3 1
OAS Investments GmbH CMP Participacoes Austria Brazil Brazil 67089RAA1 0.875
PT Portugal SGPS SA Telemar Patcipacoes (OI SA) Portugal Brazil Brazil EJ2496895 0.491
Sappi Papier Holdings GmbH Sappi Ltd. Austria South Africa South Africa 803071AC3 0.4
Rolta LLC Rolta India Ltd. United States India India 775793AA0 0.2
Source: Bloomberg, own elaboration.
Table II.2. International debt securities issuances of affiliates and guaranteed by parent companies
                                                          
23 Moreover, “PGF does not currently have any operations, revenues or assets other than those related to the issuance, administration 
and repayment of its debt securities.” It is also interesting that among the risk factors described in the SEC filing, there are very country-
specific issues concerning the Brazilian economy. For instance, historical restrictions to capital outflows in Brazil and some specificities of 
Brazilian law (“Restrictions on the movement of capital out of Brazil may impair your ability to receive payments and the guaranties and 
restrict Petrobras’ ability to make payments to PGF in US dollar”; also “Petrobras would be required to pay judgements of Brazilian courts 
enforcing its obligations under the guaranties only in reais”).  Needless to say, there are no references to Dutch-specific risk factors. 
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Brazilian subsidiary, whose outstanding debt amounts for 3.3 USD bn. Vale SA 
guarantees these debt securities (it guarantees as well outstanding loans of Vale Canada, 
although we are focusing on debt securities); henceforth, it backs the risk of its 
affiliates’ activity in international debt markets. Both examples underscore the 
importance of the financial soundness of the firms guaranteeing debt, and the biases 
which can be incurred delving into the credit risk of the issuer-firm.  
 
 
Annex III. List of emerging economies’ foreign affiliates with explicit guarantees  
Table III.1 lists some financial vehicles used by emerging economies corporations to 
issue debt-securities in international debt markets. They are selected randomly for 
companies headquartered in Brazil, Russia, Mexico, or South Africa. Most financial 
vehicles are offshore affiliates –i.e., are incorporated overseas-. Cayman Islands, 
Luxembourg, and Ireland, stand as countries of incorporation.  
Issuer of the debt 
Guarantor of the debt
Issuer of the debt 
Guarantor of the debt
Note: the chart shows only outstanding debt (not loans). 
Vale Canada Ltd Canada 0.4 bn US$
Source: Bloomberg, Standard&Poors, Fitch Ratings, Vale annual report 2013, Petrobras annual report 2013, own 
elaboration. 
Other Subsidiaries Brazil and offshore 36.5 bn US$
B. Vale SA Brasil
Vale Overseas Ltd. Cayman Islands 11.5 bn US$
Vale SA Brazil Samarco Mineracao SA Brazil 3.342 bn US$
Figure 2. Upstream transfer of risks. Organizational structure, debt-
issuers, and debt-guarantors
A. Petroleo Brasileiro (PETROBRAS SA)
Petrobras International Finance Company 
(PIFCO) Cayman Islands 26.9 bn US$
Petrobras SA Brazil Petrobras Global Finance BV (PGF) 
Netherlands
15 bn US$
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Among the selected vehicles, most belong to oil or commodity exporters firms, but in 
the list also figure transportation or construction firms. An interesting example is 
Petrobras (Petróleo Brasileiro S.A.), one of the most active firms in international 
markets in the last years, which has two financial vehicles: Petrobras Global Finance 
B.V, and Petrobras International Finance Company (PifCo). PifCo was incorporated in 
2001 in Cayman Islands, as subsidiary of Petrobras. Formerly known as Brasoil Finance 
Company, it was engaged in the borrowings in capital markets internationally, and its 
borrowings were guaranteed by Petrobras. In 2012, Petrobras decided to establish 
Global Finance B.V, based in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. It operates as a subsidiary of  
Petrobras, and it is currently its vehicle to obtain funding in international markets (the 
company does not expect to use anymore PifCo to tap markets). Many other companies, 
such as Lukoil, Gazprom, CEMEX, or Minerva, have financial vehicles, often 
incorporated overseas. 
Company Name Parent Company Parent Company Sector
Country of 
Incorporation 
Country of Ultimate 
Parent Company
Rosneft Finance SA Rosneft Oil Luxembourg Russia
Koks Finance Ltd. Koks OAO Commodity Producer Ireland Russia
GPN Capital Gazprom Neft OAO Oil Luxembourg Russia
OOO Gazprom Capital Gazprom Neft OAO Oil Russia Russia
Lukoil International Finance BV Lukoil OAO Oil Netherlands Russia
Brunswick Rail Finance Ltd. Bruunswick Rail  Ltd. Transportation Ireland Russia
ALROSA Finance SA Alrosa OA Commodity Producer Luxembourg Russia
Novatek Finance Novatek OAO Oil and gas company Ireland Russia
Rosneft International Rosneft Oil Ireland Russia
Petrobras International Finance 
Company (PifCo) Petrobras Oil Cayman Islands Brazil
Petrobras Global Finance B.V Oil Netherlands Brazil
JSB Finance II Ltd. JBS SA Food Preparations Cayman Islands Brazil
Braskem America Finance Co. Braskem SA Commodity Chemicals United States Brazil
Braskem Finance Ltd. Braskem SA Commodity Chemicals Cayman Islands Brazil
Minerva Luxembourg SA Minerva SA/Brazil Packaged Foods & Meats Luxembourg Brazil
Minerva Overseas II Ltd Minerva SA/Brazil Packaged Foods & Meats Cayman Islands Brazil
Cosan Luxembourg SA Cosan Ltd. Oil & Gas Refining & Marketing Luxembourg Brazil
Raízen Energy Finance Limited Cosan Ltd. Oil & Gas Refining & Marketing Cayman Islands Brazil
Odebrecht Finance Ltd Construtora Norberto Odebrecht 
S.A.
Construction Cayman Islands Brazil
Odebrecht Oil & Gas Finance Limited Odebrecht Oleo and Gas SA Oil & Gas Cayman Islands Brazil
CEMEX España SA/Luxembourg CEMEX SAP de CV Cement Luxembourg Mexico
CEMEX Finance LLC CEMEX SAP de CV Cement United States Mexico
C8 Capital Ltd CEMEX SAP de CV Cement Mexico Mexico
C10-EUR Capital (SPV) Limited CEMEX SAP de CV Cement Mexico Mexico
C10 Capital (SPV) CEMEX SAP de CV Cement British Virgin Islands Mexico
C5 Capital (SPV) CEMEX SAP de CV Cement Mexico Mexico
Anglogold ashanti holdings plc AngloGold Ashanti Gold Isle of Man South Africa
Sasol Financing International PLC Sasol Ltd. Energy and chemicals company Isle of Man South Africa
Source: Bloomberg, Standard&Poors, own elaboration. 
Table III.1. Financial vehicles of emerging economies NFCs
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Table III.2 list a few affiliates of firms headquartered in India, Brazil, Mexico, South 
Africa and Russia. These affiliates are incorporated in countries as disparate as United 
States, United Kingdom, and Canada.  
 
Indian firms figure prominently in this list, reflecting the noticeable process of cross-
border takeovers since the late 2000s. This process was driven, to an important extent, 
by large-scale mergers and acquisitions. Hindalco Industries is an interesting example. 
Hindalco Industries is an aluminum manufacturing company owned by Aditya Birla 
Group, and founded in 1958. In 2007, it acquired Novelis Inc., an American industrial 
aluminum company, for 6 USD bn. Novelis is now a US-subsidiary of an Indian 
multinational, and part of its chain of production and sales of aluminum and copper in 
India and internationally. A second colourful story is that of Tata Motors Ltd., another 
large Indian company. Founded in 1946, it is part of the Tata Group, and manufactures 
and sells commercial and passenger vehicles in India. It used to have several 
subsidiares. In 2008, Tata Motors Ltd paid 2.5 USD bn for Jaguar Land Rover. This 
acquisition was a milestone in the history of the company, and Jaguar-Land Rover is 
currently the company's largest subsidiary24. We could add a great many of examples of 
emerging economies firms’ affiliates all over the world25. These affiliates might also be 
tapping international debt markets, in a context of easy access to international debt 
markets.   
Company Name Parent Company Country of Incorporation 
Company
Country of Ultimate 
Parent Company
Acquisition 
date
Sappi Papier Holding GmbH Sappi Ltd. Austria South Africa n.a.
Steinhoff Finance Holding GmbH Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd. Austria South Africa n.a.
Zain Africa BV Bharti Airtel Ltd Netherlands India n.a.
Novelis Inc Hindalco Industries Ltd. United States India n.a.
Imperial Energy Corp. PLC ONGC Videsh Ltd. Russia India n.a.
Jaguar; Land-Rover Tata Motors Ltd. United Kingdom India n.a.
General Chemical Industrial Products Inc. Tata Chemicals United States India n.a.
Tata Steek UK Holdings Ltd. Tata Steel United Kingdom India n.a.
Pilgrim's Pride Corporation JBS SA United States Brazil n.a.
Vale Canada SA Vale SA Canada Brazil n.a.
Gerdau Ameristeel US Inc. Gerdau United States Brazil n.a.
CEMEX España SA CEMEX SAP de CV Spain Mexico n.a.
Canada Bread Company, Limited Grupo Bimbo S.A.B. de C.V. Canada Mexico 2014
Severstal Columbus, LLC PAO Severstal United States Russia n.a.
JMC Steel Novolipetsk Steel United States Russia 2014
Table III.2. Foreign affiliates of emerging economies firms
Source: Bloomberg, Standard&Poors, own elaboration. 
                                                          
24 Headquartered in United Kingdom, it sells luxury utility vehicles and sedans across the world, contributing to over 90% of Tata Motors' 
consolidated EBITDA. 
25 For instance, Tata Chemicals, another company of the Tata Group, acquired General Chemical Industrial Products Inc. in 2008, paying 1 
USD bn for the company. Now, this company manufactures and sells soda ash in the United States, a raw material in the production of 
various glass products, and exports its products to markets primarily in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. This company, founded in 1968, is 
known since 2011 as Tata Chemicals North America Inc. was formerly known as General Chemical Industrial Products Inc. and changed its 
name to Tata Chemicals North America Inc. in April 2011. 
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Annex IV. Debt issued by firms headquartered in emerging economies and all its 
affiliates (nationality measure). Potential biases.  
The exercise of collecting debt-guaranteed by emerging economies firms is demanding. 
As a short-cut, it is tempting to collect the debt-securities issued by firms headquartered 
in emerging economies and all their affiliates; and to match the debt-security data with 
the ultimate parent company information. On an aggregate basis, the debt compiled 
using this criterion is referred to as the “nationality measure”.  
This criterion removes the need to identify transfers of risk. However, it can bias 
significantly the results: not all affiliates transfer upstream their risk to their parent 
companies; some non-financial corporations’ affiliates are standalone entities, which 
issue debt without guarantees from their parent companies. There are two cases.  
First, there are affiliates incorporated in emerging economies which are standalone 
entities; their debt issuances are not guaranteed by their parent companies. There are a 
few in our database. For instance, Kansas City Southern de México; it is an affiliate of 
Kansas City Southern Lines, a US-headquartered company26. The parent company does 
not guarantee the debt issued by Kansas City Southern de México; thus, it is an 
independent firm. This has several implications. On the one hand, this affiliate shall be 
treated as an emerging economy firm, even if it is owned by a US company, as happens 
in this example.27 The financial risks of their activities lay in emerging economies. 
However, this debt would be missed if it is complied for firms headquartered in 
emerging economies and all its affiliates. On the other, the debt-security data should not 
be matched with the ultimate parent company information: international investors 
analyze the risk of investing in the foreign-owned affiliate; thus, it is important to 
retrieve its financial and non-financial information, and not that of its ultimate parent 
company.  
Second, an emerging economy company might not guarantee all the debt-securities 
issued by its foreign-owned affiliates. Table IV.1 lists some debt-securities issued by 
foreign-affiliates of emerging economies firms, which are not guaranteed. Examples 
include Jaguar Land Rover, Pilgrims’ Pride, Novelis, among others. Novelis is a US–
nonfinancial affiliate of Hindalco, an Indian company. Pilgrim Pride is a US–
nonfinancial affiliate of JBS, the Brazilian food producer. In both cases, the debt-
securities issued by foreign-owned affiliates is not guaranteed by their parent 
companies; the telltale sign there is not a risk transfer is that the country of risk assigned 
to these securities is equivalent to the country of incorporation of the subsidiary (and 
different to the ultimate parent company country). The controlling interest of these 
affiliates -in India and Brazil, respectively- does not guarantee their foreign-owned 
affiliates’ debt-securities. Debt-securities issued by these entities should not be 
considered in our analysis.   
                                                          
26 The number of these foreign-owned, independent affiliates, operating in emerging economies is not large in the case of 
non-financial corporations. Though, there are many other examples. For instance, in Mexico Concesionaria Mexiquense SA, 
an independent subsidiary of Obrascón Huarte Lain, S.A, a Spanish company; SatMex, the Mexican telecommunication 
company, was acquired by the French firm Eutelsat  in 2014, but its country of risk remains Mexican. 
27 These affiliates are integrated with their parent companies in some relevant dimensions, such as revenues or profits, but 
not in terms of financial stability risks: they retain the risk. 
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Firms’ financial reports support our decision. Jaguar Land Rover Automotive PLC 
(JLR) is an interesting example, since it is very active in international debt markets. 
Figure IV.1 shows its organizational structure; it is incorporated in United Kingdom as 
a subsidiary of Tata Motors, an Indian firm. JLR has several outstanding notes (debt 
securities), with different maturities, and a revolving credit facility. These liabilities 
have been subscribed by JLR, and guaranteed by its holding. The parent company, Tata 
Motors, does not guarantee them. There is no upstream transfer of risk. When deciding 
to price the risk of acquiring JLR debt-securities, international investors will look at 
JLR financial and non-financial information. We treat JLR as an UK company; thus, it 
Company Name Parent Company Country of 
Incorporation
Country of Risk Country of Ultimate 
Parent Company
CUSIP Amount 
(US bn)
Jaguar Land Rover Automotive 
PLC
Tata Motors Ltd. United 
Kingdom
United Kingdom India EK0498676 0.65
Novelis Inc. Hindalco Industries United States United States India 67000XAL0 1.1
Rain CII Carbon LLC /CII Carbon 
Corp. Rain Industries Ltd. United States United States India EJ4718106 0.4
Moy Park Bondco PLC Marfrig Global Food
United 
Kingdom United Kingdom Brazil EK2879899 0.33
Springs Industries Inc. Cia de Tecidos do Norte de 
Minas
United States United States Brazil 851783AB6 0.47
WPE International Cooperatief UA Venti SA Brazil Brazil Luxembourg 92935NAA4 0.39
Pilgrim's Pride Corp. JBS SA United States United States Brazil 72147KAB4 0.49
Table IV.1. International debt securities issuances of affiliates not guaranteed by parent companies
Source: Bloomberg, own elaboration.
Guarantor of the debt
Issuer of the debt
Parent company
Source: Jaguar Land Rover Overview, November 2014; own elaboration.
Figure IV.1 Financially independent affiliates. Organizational structure of Jaguar Land 
Rover, affiliate of Tata Motors LTD.
Tata Motors Ltd
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is not in our sample. Similar insights are obtained from JLR debt-securities offerings28; 
and from external credit agencies decisions: Fitch rates JLR on a standalone basis, 
highlighting there is no parent support.  
The biases of this alternative measure can go unnoticed in aggregate analyses; the two 
effects described have opposite signs and could offset each other. This is shown in table 
IV.2, which reports international debt issuances, for Indian and Brazilian companies, 
measured with two different criteria. The aggregate debt guaranteed by emerging 
economies firms is referred to as the “Debt-guaranteed by emerging economies firms”, 
as described above, it can be issued by firms owned by advanced economies firms. The 
aggregate debt issued by firms headquartered in emerging economies and all their 
affiliates is referred to as the “Debt by nationality”. In table IV.2, we break both 
measures down by the domicile of the issuer: onshore, offshore centre, and non-offshore 
centre. As a memorandum item, we include the onshore funding, or debt issuances of 
firms resident in emerging economies; it is the residence criteria, akin to balance-of-
payment/international investment position methodology.    
 
The analysis of Indian aggregate debt shows two remarkable differences. First, Debt-
guaranteed by emerging economies firms and issued in non-offshore centers is much 
smaller than Debt-by nationality: there are no Indian-guaranteed in United Kingdom; 
but issuances of Indian firms from United Kingdom amount to 4.7 USD bn. This 
reflects the heightened activity of Jaguar Land-Rover in debt fund raising: it is an Indian 
affiliate, but it is independent; its debt-risk is not transferred to its ultimate parent 
company. The same happens with two independent Indian affiliates incorporated in US 
and active in international markets: Essar Steel Minnesotta LLC and Rain CII Carbon 
LLC29. Their debt-securities issuances are included in the Debt by nationality measure, 
                                                          
28 JLR announced the 23th of April 2015 a 10-year 400 £ million senior note offering, stating that these securities “will be guaranteed (the 
“Guarantees”) on a senior unsecured basis by Jaguar Land Rover Limited and Jaguar Land Rover Holdings Limited.”Interestingly, the 
announcement was welcomed by both the CFO of Jaguar Land Rover and Tata Motors. This suggests that, beyond legal risk-fencing, there 
is a reputational or informal support.  
29 Essar Steel Minnesotta LLC was formerly known as Minnesota Steel Industries, LLC and changed its name to Essar Steel Minnesota LLC 
in September 2008. As of October 24, 2007, Essar Steel Minnesota LLC operates as a subsidiary of Essar Steel India Limited. Rain CII 
Carbon LLC is engaged in the production and sale of calcined petroleum coke (CPC) for the manufacture of aluminium. Rain CII Carbon LLC 
operates as a subsidiary of Rain Industries Limited, based in Hyderabad, India. 
Panel A. India
Dent-guaranteed Debt-by-nationality Difference
All locations 114,007 120,077 -6,070
Onshore 99,806 93,532 6,275
Non-offshore centres 3,573 15,072 -11,498
Offshore centres 8,844 9,382 -538
Panel B. Brazil
Dent-guaranteed Debt-by-nationality Difference
Total 268,818 250,011 18,807
Onshore 175,846 155,721 20,125
Non-offshore centres 13,580 16,143 -2,562
Offshore centres 79,391 78,147 1,244
Source: Bloomberg, own elaboration. 
Table IV.2. Non-financial corporations international debt issuances (2010-2014). Alternative metrics.
Note: International debt issuances by domicile/esidence amount for 100.717 US million in India; and 178.267 in Brazil
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but excluded in the Debt-guaranteed by emerging economies firms.30 The activity of 
these affiliates does not pose risks for financial stability in India. Second, this reduction 
in aggregate debt is partially offset by debt issued by foreign affiliates operating in India 
and not guaranteed by their parent companies. For the sake of financial stability 
analysis, they are Indian companies; hence, they are included in the Debt-guaranteed by 
emerging economies firms’ measure. They are not included in the Debt by nationality 
measure, since their parent company is not Indian.  
All together, our measure renders a lower volume of external debt in India. But this 
result is country-specific. The opposite happens in Brazil: the Debt-guaranteed by 
emerging economies firms is higher than the Debt by nationality.  The reason is that the 
two biases have different size. In Brazil the amount issued by foreign companies 
operating in Brazil and not guaranteed by their parent company is remarkable. This 
more than offsets the debt issued by independent Brazilian affiliates in the US. Finally, 
it is worth mentioning that in Brazil a non-negligible fraction of debt is issued by 
companies domiciled outside the home country, mostly reflecting financing raised in 
offshore centers.  
The differences seem small in absolute terms, but are important. Existing differences 
reflect differences in the type of firms included. But their credit risks can differ 
markedly, henceforth biasing the conclusions. These differences might be non-random. 
More worrisome, they can remain hidden in country-aggregate measures of debt, since 
the two biases can offset each other.  
To shed more light on this, in chart IV.2 we show the international debt issuances in the 
period 2010-2014 by firms in each of the four largest economies: Brazil, Russia, 
Mexico, and India. Debt has been aggregated using three measures: Debt-guaranteed by 
emerging economies firms; Debt by Nationality; and Debt by residence/domicile.  
 
                                                          
30 
There are also a number of Brazilian affiliates in the US which are independent from their parent companies, in terms of risk, and active in 
international markets. These are Pilgrim’s Pride Corp and Springs Industries IncSprings Global, Inc. It operates as a subsidiary of Springs 
Global Participações S.A. It .manufactures, markets, and distributes home textile and furnishing products. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp is a subsidiary 
of JBS USA Holdings, Inc 
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Source: Bloomberg, own elaboration.
Chart IV.1. Emerging economies non-financial corporations.                                                   
Different metrics of international debt issuances. 
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The flaws of the last measure are well-known, and we focus on the comparison between 
the first two. Both measures are similar in all countries. But this should not be 
comforting: sizable biases are hidden, since domestic firms have standalone affiliates 
overseas, and there are standalone foreign affiliates operating in these countries. Hence, 
beneath similar aggregate measures there are different firms. And these firms can differ 
in dimensions relevant to understand their access to international debt markets: ability 
to absorb flotation costs, informational asymmetries, or risks of financial distress. As a 
result, empirical results could suffer fatal flaws.  
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Annex V. Univariate analyses. Tests for stochastic dominance. Further results. 
We aim to use a criterion capable to characterize the whole distribution of our variables 
of interest, setting an order of preference between the different groups of firms for each 
of these variables. This exercise cannot be done using just descriptive statistics such as 
the mean, the variance or different percentiles. It cannot be done either by 
characterizing the density function using non-parametric methods such as kernel-
estimation because this approach does not provide an order of preference between 
distributions.  
We go one step further by using the concept of stochastic dominance to set an order of 
preference among different groups of firms depending on their balance-sheet 
characteristics and financing conditions.  This concept has been mostly used in the 
literature of wealth and income inequality (Davidson and Duclos (2000)) as well as in 
financial economics. 
Let G and F be the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) from two populations. 
Then, weak first order stochastic dominance (hereafter SD1) of G over F corresponds to 

ሺሻ ൑ 	ሺሻ for all Ǥ This inequality establishes a strong condition regarding the 
characteristics of the different groups of firms. For instance, if we analyze the variable 
ROA, G SD1 F means that for any level of ROA “z”, the proportion of firms with ROA 
greater than “z” is at least as large in the group associated to G as it is in group 
associated to F. 
Davidson and Duclos (2000) suggested an approach based on tests of inequality 
constraints to build up test of stochastic dominance. The main problem of this approach 
is that comparisons are made at a fixed number of arbitrarily chosen points, introducing 
the possibility of test inconsistency. We will follow the approach developed by Barret 
and Donald (2003), which considers tests of stochastic dominance of any pre-specified 
order that are based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test that compare the objects at all 
points. The objects being compared are partial integrals, and since these objects are 
compared at all points in the range of our variable of interest, the tests have the potential 
of being consistent tests for the full set of restrictions implied by stochastic dominance.  
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 60 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1603
 
Annex VI. Multivariate analysis and robustness checks. Further results. 
 
Including Financial Ratios
VARIABLES (1) (2) (1) (2)
Amount Issued 0.079 -0.299***
[0.104] [0.095]
Term -0.056*** -0.078*** -0.049** -0.076***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.021] [0.022]
Local GAAP 1.217*** 1.145*** 1.201** 1.053**
[0.411] [0.384] [0.482] [0.452]
ADR -0.892*** -0.896*** -0.526* -0.715***
[0.251] [0.230] [0.277] [0.242]
MOVE Index -0.004 -0.012*** -0.002 -0.010*
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006]
Rated Security -0.194 -1.166*** -0.74 -1.914***
[0.394] [0.349] [0.573] [0.520]
Bond Holder Right 0.844** 0.52 1.329** 1.046*
[0.350] [0.323] [0.614] [0.590]
No Financial Info 0.134 0.094
[0.258] [0.240]
Market Based 0.490* 0.440* 0.585* 0.597**
[0.252] [0.235] [0.316] [0.294]
Firm Assets -0.231** -0.231**
[0.108] [0.099]
Fixed Assets to Total Assets -0.004 -0.004
[0.007] [0.006]
Altman score <1.21 0.234 -0.530*
[0.332] [0.313]
Constant 1.175* 6.399*** 1.962** 6.843***
[0.621] [0.571] [0.973] [0.913]
Observations 2,579 2,579 1,193 1,193
Time Dummies NO NO NO NO
LR Chi2 445.3 445.3 175.4 175.4
Prob>CHi2 0 0 0 0
Degrees Freedom 18 18 20 20
Table VI.1 Determinants of market of issuance of debt-securities. Multinomial 
Logit. Coefficients
Financial Contracting Features
Robust standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: multivariate logit, base outcome is firm being able to issue in global bond market; 1 if 
firm issues only in US144A; and 2 if firm issues only in Eurobond market.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES US 144A Eurobond US 144A Eurobond
Amount Issued 1.053 0.824**
[0.109] [0.067]
Bond: Maturity (years) 0.941*** 0.903*** 0.949** 0.904***
[0.018] [0.016] [0.023] [0.021]
Local GAAP -excluding IFRS/US GAAP 4.597*** 3.673*** 4.444*** 3.342***
[1.875] [1.412] [2.086] [1.498]
ADR (cross-listed in US) 0.388*** 0.333*** 0.559** 0.394***
[0.102] [0.079] [0.163] [0.099]
MOVE Index at issuance 0.994 0.989*** 0.995 0.991*
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006]
RatedSecurity 0.606 0.206*** 0.386* 0.113***
[0.234] [0.066] [0.202] [0.051]
Bonds include any bond-holder rights 1.111 1.202 0.964 0.825
[0.296] [0.283] [0.297] [0.229]
No financial information 1.279 1.213
[0.344] [0.298]
Post 2009 1.997*** 1.616** 2.588*** 2.295***
[0.526] [0.392] [0.861] [0.714]
Firm Assets 0.821** 0.775***
[0.078] [0.069]
Fixed Assets to Total Assets (ratio) 0.999 0.997
[0.007] [0.006]
Altman score < 1.21 0.658 0.461***
[0.185] [0.117]
Constant 4.290** 417.141*** 43.991*** 3,186.359***
[2.573] [226.441] [44.634] [3,071.415]
Observations 2,439 2,439 1,116 1,116
Time Dummies NO NO NO NO
LR Chi2 437.4 437.4 181.5 181.5
Prob>CHi2 0 0 0 0
Degrees Freedom 18 18 20 20
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table VI.2 Robustness checks. Multinomial Logit. Controlling for previous access 
Financial Contracting Features Including Financial Ratios
Note: multivariate logit, base outcome is firm is able to issue in global bond market; firms with previous access to 
global bonds are removed from outcomes US144A, and Eurobond
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Non-
Switchers
Switchers
P-value, Ho is 
identity
Wilcoxon rank-
sum Test 
(Probability 
Order)
Two-
sided p-
value
Upper one-sided 
p-value
Total Assets 9,768 13,729 0.2519 60.71% 0.07 0.03
Leverage 2.23 2.64 0.0661 63.09% 0.74 0.63
Current Ratio 1.36 1.33 0.8429 49.06% 0.99 0.51
ROA 4.13 4.15 1.0000 49.94% 0.60 0.30
Altman Score 1.10 1.35 0.0412 61.76% 0.02 0.01
Fixed Assets to Tot 56.94 58.53 1.0000 58.72% 0.09 0.05
CAPEX to Total A 11.17 6.50 0.1681 40.83% 0.13 0.94
Interest Coverage R 3.38 4.68 0.1307 55.39% 0.30 0.15
Investment to Tota 2.45 1.78 0.2298 45.67% 0.55 0.72
EBITDA to Total A 13.02 17.24 0.0307 64.08% 0.00 0.00
Asset Growth 12.51 11.92 0.7396 51.78% 0.94 0.47
Source: own elaboration. Probability order: probability that the switchers are above non-switchers. 
Table VI.3. Non-Parametric Tests, Global Bond Issuers: Switchers vs Non-Switchers (at the firm-
year level). Balance-Sheet Information
Panel A. Median values Panel B. Test Equality Medians Panel C. Test Equality Means
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